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This thesis examines the gift relationship in blood donation and the role institu-
tions play in this relationship. Using survey data that encompasses all countries 
in the European Union blood donation is approached with the blood collection 
regimes. New countries that haven’t been categorised into regimes before are cat-
egorised and analysed in the thesis. Additionally, the donor population of the 
European Union is examined to uncover who donate blood. 
  
Blood is not something that is simply donated. It is collected by organisations 
that affect what kind of activity donation of blood is. These organisations are in 
a peculiar gift relationship with the people who donate blood. This gift relation-
ship somewhat reminds that of Maussian gift of archaic tribes. Giving gifts, re-
ceiving them, and reciprocating are all parts of the relationship. 
 
The results showed that the gift relationship is still present in blood donation. 
However, blood seems not strongly connected to other altruistically activity, at 
least on country level. Blood collection regimes still have explanatory power in 
explaining blood donors of the European Union. Donor population in each regime 
was somewhat distinct, especially compared to other country level explanations. 
Blood donor population showed that the donor population differs from country to 
another and between regimes. Blood donors are not some unique type of people 
who donate people. Rather, they are people who blood collecting organisations 
have recruited as donors.  
 
 
Keywords: blood donation, comparative research, blood collection regimes, multilevel 
modeling, exploratory factor analysis, Eurobarometer  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Blood transfusions and blood products are a crucial part of Western medicine. 
Human blood and blood components are mainly used in surgeries and as medicine 
to help assist in otherwise crippling diseases such as haemophilia. Throughout 
Europe, blood is collected mainly from uncompensated volunteers who are known 
as blood donors. In most European countries payment for donation is strictly 
forbidden and donation of blood is considered a form of pure altruistic behaviour. 
Blood donation has been described as the gift of life, in which one gives a part of 
itself to help others in need (Piliavin 1990, p.444). After donating approximately 
half a liter of blood it is tested, stored, and sent to hospital blood banks. The 
person receiving the blood through transfusion and the person donating it never 
meet each other, which is said to emphasizes the altruistic motivation behind 
donating blood. 
However, this absence of face to face relationship within blood donation conflicts 
with the classical explanations of gift relationship (Healy 2010, 17). Classical view 
of gift can be traced to Marcel Mauss’ (2002 [1923]) essay L’ Essai sur le don, 
which was published in the L’Année sociologique. Richard M. Titmuss later fa-
mously applied Mauss’ theory of the gift to blood donation in his seminal book 
The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1970), and put forth 
the proposition that donation of blood is a gift unique to modern societies in that 
it is truly altruistic. As Western societies are continuing their gradual transfor-
mation to market-based exchanges, the gift of blood has remained as one of the 
most resilient to oppose this. Indeed, World Health Organization has declared as 
their objective to have 100% non-remunerated blood donation across the world 
by 2020 (WHO 2010, p.5).  
However, blood cannot be seen only as a gift given from a person to another. It 
is also something that is collected by organisations that shape what kind of 
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activity blood donation is. Therefore, studying blood donation simply from the 
gift perspective is not enough because altruism and gift giving are deeply embed-
ded in national contexts as Healy (2000) argues in his study of the European 
blood collection regime. The research task of this thesis is threefold. First, apply-
ing Maussian theory of the gift to blood donation. Then I apply the framework of 
blood collection regimes to member states of the European Union. Last task is to 
examine the blood donor population of the European Union to uncover of what 
kind of people donate blood in the EU.  
The research questions of this thesis are: 
1. Can blood donation be considered as a unique gift relationship? 
2. Are the blood collection regimes applicable to the expanded EU, and what 
are the role of regimes to the gift relationship in blood donation? 
3. What are the characteristics of blood donor population in the EU? 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, the discussion on the gift of blood is presented. 
I start by discussing Marcel Mauss’ theory of the gift and move on to how Richard 
M. Titmuss famously applied Maussian theory of the gift to blood donation. Next, 
cases which exemplify how the logic of the gift has affected situations in blood 
donation are presented, cases where different kinds of shocks to the blood system 
brought the logics of the gift visible. The theory of the gift is not the over-reaching 
theory of this thesis, but because blood donation is often considered a gift, this 
part of the thesis examines the questions of: what similarities and dissimilarities 
does the gift of blood have with the Maussian gift? And, how does gift exchange 
differ from market exchange? 
In the third chapter, the blood collection regimes introduced by Kieran Healy in 
his article Embedded Altruism: Blood Collection Regimes and the European Un-
ion’s Donor Population are introduced. Healy argued that blood is not just 
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something that is donated by an altruistic individual; it is collected by organisa-
tions that shape what kind of activity blood donation is, and that in emphasizing 
the gift relation this had been largely neglected. However, as the study was made 
in 2000 and consisted of countries belonging to EU in 1994, the European Union 
has since gone through major expansion. Thus, in this chapter I apply the blood 
collection regimes to categorise the new countries. This section mostly consists of 
the typology of the countries in regards of the regimes. The reason for this is to 
later examine if the regimes still explain differences in blood donation across the 
EU.  
The fourth chapter introduces the study design. First, I explain the hypotheses 
that will be examined later, after which the data and the variables used in this 
quantitative thesis are introduced. The methods used in the study, factor analysis, 
visualised correlation coefficients, multilevel logistic regression, and logistic re-
gression are then explained. The hypotheses are constructed from review of the 
previous studies regarding blood donation. 
Chapter 5 is the part where results of quantitative methods are shown. The hy-
potheses are revisited here, and they are confirmed or discarded. The final part 
of this thesis, Chapter 6, is the discussion. That is where the results are discussed 
further.  
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2 THE GIFT OF BLOOD 
2.1 Maussian View of the Gift 
The concept of the gift at first glimpse seems simple. A gift is usually seen as 
some kind of item given to another person voluntary, with no expectation of 
anything in return. However, the matter is more complicated. Academic study of 
the concept of a ‘gift’ is generally traced back to French sociologist Marcel Mauss, 
who studied gift giving behaviour in archaic societies. Mauss, who was the nephew 
and the intellectual heir of Durkheim, is sometimes referred to as an anthropolo-
gist, though never conducted fieldwork himself. Instead, he used data collected by 
anthropologists such as Bronisław Malinowski on gift exchanges in archaic socie-
ties. Mauss interpreted the gift exchange as the foundation of all exchanges in 
societies before formation of money-based exchange (Mauss 2002, 4–5). Therefore, 
the exchange of gifts served as a force that tied clans together and at the same 
time held the power to divide them. Moreover, the phenomenon determined the 
division of labour and forced individuals and groups to participate in the recipro-
cal exchange of gifts (Mauss 2002, p.94). 
Mauss demonstrated how gifts are in principle voluntary, but in truth giving and 
receiving gifts create obligations. Mauss saw the fulfillment of these obligations 
as shrouded behind the veil of generous gifts, while in truth they were always 
given with effort to benefit the giver of the gift. (Mauss 2002, pp.4–5.) Mauss also 
proposed that the gift had remained in his contemporary French society (Mauss 
2002, pp.83–84), and in Mauss’ footsteps, Godbout and Caillé present in their 
book The World of the Gift how the gift still constitute exchanges in modern 
society in which forms of compulsory and voluntary mix together in variety of 
ways (Godbout and Caillé 1998). 
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On one hand, to Mauss, pure gifts that are given without creating some kind of 
obligation or fulfilling those obligations are non-existent. Even gifts between hus-
band and wife, were to Mauss, part of ‘constant’ payment made by husband to 
wife for sexual services (Mauss 2002, p.93). But on the other hand, Mauss em-
phasized that a gift is not about utilitaristic endeavor of self-interest. Even as 
individuals in archaic societies collected riches, self-interest itself was different 
than how modern world sees it. In archaic societies, cumulation of wealth went 
hand in hand with expending that wealth as gifts to others to accumulate obliga-
tions and followers. (Mauss 2002, pp.96–97.) Accumulation of wealth always 
served to maintain or create obligations or to restrict someone outside of the 
circulation of gifts and the social relations they served. Mauss traced the concept 
of self-interest to western origin and claimed, that it was almost impossible to 
translate into previously wide-ranging languages, such as Latin, ancient Greek, or 
Arabic (Mauss 2002, p.97). A gift given to someone is part of the relationship in 
which the gift was given. Thus, the circulation of gifts has the power to bind 
people in relationships that exemplify institutions surrounding them (Douglas 
2010, pp.xv-xvi). The gift was an important and integral part of people’s relation-
ships, and it determined the intensity of the relationship and the position of the 
participants in a given society. As Healy summarises, the gift is something much 
more general than an item given (Healy 2010, p.15).  
In modern societies, the position in the society can be (at least to some extent) 
indicated with things bought with money in market-based exchanges. For this 
reason, it is important to show the main differences between the gift and the ever 
invasive1 market exchange. At its simplest form, the market exchange is a social 
institution that determines how products or services are exchanged and priced by 
competition between offers to buy and sell said products or services (Aspers 2011, 
 
1 Word ‘invasive’ used here free without prejudice. Reason for the choice of word is the undoubted 
force in which market has expanded into parts of life previously determined by other logics of 
exchange. 
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p.4). Participation in the exchange is voluntary and every participant decides as 
an atomistic actor the price in which they participate in the exchange. These 
exchanges are mediated by money, which acts as relative value of the items or 
services and makes it possible to numerate the value of the objects. This is very 
simplified view of the market exchange, but it is very useful as a simplification in 
this case to illustrate the differences between gift and market exchanges. 
According to Robert Kowalski there are three main differences between market 
and gift exchanges. First is the search of equivalence in things exchanged, second 
is the required immediacy of reciprocation of the exchange, and the third is the 
freedom to quit the interaction once the exchange has been made. (2011, pp.192–
93.) Equivalence of things exchanged refers to competitive nature of market. As 
there are multiple offers on both sides of the exchange, the participants try to 
maximise benefit from the trade. If the items up for exchange are of similar quality 
individual actors choose the cheapest one. In gift exchange, however, when giving 
the gift both the chance you ever receive a gift in return and the exact nature of 
return gift are shrouded in mystery. This is where gift exchange acquires its un-
balanced nature. Reciprocal gift must always return more than was received or 
develop the relation, and failing that, participants risk losing honor and harming 
the social relationship in which gifts were traded. The second main difference — 
the immediacy of reciprocation — is the notion that in market exchange money 
and products change ownership immediately or the schedule for its delivery is 
explicitly stated. In gift exchange reciprocity is assumed but never guaranteed.2 
The gift is given in service of the social relationship in which it was given in hope 
that somewhere in future other participant will do their part in turn. It is not 
given to gain something immediately, rather it is given to bind people together. 
The obligations created when giving, receiving or reciprocating occur through the 
 
2 The same can of course be said of market exchange, as dishonest actors may take advantage of 
market participants. However, the sanctions from such acts come mainly through law instead of 
social relations. 
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social relations the gift serves. Third difference is market exchanges nature of 
being able to quit the exchange freely. In market exchange atomistic individuals 
or groups constantly evaluate offers and choose which one they choose to trade 
with. Gift on the other hand is part of longer continuum and escaping these ex-
changes is not possible without consequences, be they losing honor or losing con-
nections. 
Another integral part of the gift is its informality. When the rules of the gift 
become more explicit, we approach the domain of a contract. A contract is binding 
and cannot be refused. A contract, opposed to gift, loses its value in creating or 
maintaining relations. (Godbout and Caillé 1998, p.188.) Market based exchange 
is thus closer to a contract than a gift since the terms of contract in exchange are 
known to participants and are fulfilled as the exchange takes place. In gift the 
terms for the exchange are never as clear, and the giver of the gift acquires power 
in the relationship that was made visible by a gift. A gift carries within the obli-
gations and forces that can be found in the relationship. Even as both gift and 
market exchange are on the surface about exchange, in market exchange results 
are what matter most, while in gift social relations are the most important thing 
(Godbout and Caillé 1998, p.179).  
Market exchanges are — in simplest and most atomistic view — seen as isolated 
acts that are not connected to each other. To understand the gift Godbout and 
Caillé argue that it should be seen as a cycle that can be broken to three move-
ments, which are to give, to receive, and to reciprocate (1998, p.19). The gift is 
thus the whole cycle, and after each movement another should follow. This is the 
binding force of the gift. 
In the conclusion of The Gift Mauss discussed the relationship between market 
forces and emerging social security systems. He believed these new systems were 
reappearing in French society, in a form in which the state and other organisations 
are part of the gift exchange (2002, p.89). It also important to note that Mauss 
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did not believe market exchanges free from themes of the gift. For example, he 
stated that “The various economic activities, for example the market, are suffused 
with rituals and myths. They retain a ceremonial character that is obligatory and 
effective.” (Mauss 2002, p.92). He believed that the cycle of the gift was such an 
integral part of social human nature that it was part of all exchanges, and that 
market and money had replaced some important parts of it. Emerging social se-
curity systems were to Mauss reappearance of the themes of gift. However, mod-
ern social security systems are quite calculating, and their principals are based in 
the rights of the individual. The rules are in most cases transparent and fall more 
into the category of contracts, where the participants are individuals and various 
social security organisations that perform those contracts. For example, labour 
market organisations that in some countries pay unemployment benefits do not 
give it as a gift, or the individual who pays for unemployment insurance does not 
do it in the logic of the gift. Nor are taxes considered a gift to the State, as they 
are bindingly compulsory. Still, the logic or reciprocity is present in the social 
security systems. For example, Danielsbacka and Kujala (2015) show how the 
expectation of reciprocity between the elite and the lay people affects the rela-
tionships between these classes, and especially what happens when these expecta-
tions are not met. The themes of the gift are present, but the exchanges are not 
governed by the logics of the gift. 
More recently Viviana Zelizer (2010) has in depth pointed out how everyday eco-
nomic actions are full of actions and beliefs that serve the social connections that 
show the positions and status of those participating in them. One might ask, why 
it is necessary to look at exchanges in archaic societies — especially concerning 
contemporary issue such as blood donation — when the gift can be seen every-
where around us? Pyyhtinen argues that it is “–only after reading Mauss that we 
were able to know that we ‘already knew’.” (Pyyhtinen 2016, p.9). As Mauss de-
scribes the magical or religious forces that take hold of individuals in archaic 
societies, and then using the same viewpoint to our society it soon becomes 
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apparent that the exchanges we make in our daily lives are not that different. 
Some ‘magical’ force makes us obliged to reciprocate when we are given gifts, to 
keep items given to us (even if we do not use or enjoy them), and to accept gifts 
given (unless the giver is someone unwanted). A gift from someone we do not 
want a gift from is deeply unsettling, as it binds us into a relationship between 
the person. 
To summarise Mauss’ view of the gift, it is not the single occasion in which the 
gift changes ownership, the gifted item itself, or the obligation fulfilled or created. 
The gift is the social form of all aforementioned things which creates the force 
that shapes communities. Even if the gift is usually made only visible when ex-
change of items or services occur it is always there, shaping the way in which we 
relate to each other as individuals and groups. 
2.1 The Gift Relationship in Blood Donation 
Richard M. Titmuss’ The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy 
(1970) is the most well-known and the most influential book concerning blood 
donation from sociological perspective. Titmuss examined blood from Maussian 
perspective, and according to him it was different from the gift of archaic societies. 
“Unlike gift-exchange in archaic societies, there is in the free gift of blood 
to unnamed strangers no contract of custom, no legal bond, no functional 
determinism, no situations of discriminatory power, domination, constraint 
or compulsion, no sense of shame or guilt, no gratitude imperative and no 
need for the penitence of a Chrysostom” 
(Titmuss 1970, p.239). 
Indeed, the gift of blood in which the recipient and the donor never meet each 
other and is given without expectation of reciprocity is different than a gift given 
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to serve some function in a social relationship. The main contribution of The Gift 
Relationship was however Titmuss’ comparison of blood transfusion systems 
across the world. Titmuss showed that blood transfusion systems in countries that 
paid for blood were not only less efficient, but more dangerous to recipients than 
those systems that functioned according to principals a gift given without com-
pensation.3 Titmuss showed the superiority of voluntary donor system in five 
areas. First the commercial system was more likely to entail unethical ways in 
collection of blood. Second was that blood collected in commercial system was 
more prone to shortages and the spoilage of blood products were higher. Third 
was the higher cost of administration in commercial systems, and fourth was the 
higher cost of blood to its recipient. The fifth, and possibly the most important, 
was the fact that blood collected in a commercial system was of less quality and 
contained more infections and diseases. (Titmuss 1970, p.246.) Titmuss showed 
how system based on gift exchange bested market-based system in the same areas 
that are usually seen as the most beneficial aspects of markets. 
While the most convincing of Titmuss’ arguments were that of the better quality 
of blood in gift-based system, the most interesting in regard to gift exchange was 
that in a society constantly transforming into more egoistic society, blood dona-
tion gives individuals chance to act altruistically (Titmuss 1970, p.13). This led 
to his other point: when blood was bought from individuals, people who give it 
from altruistic purposes are ‘crowded out’ as blood donation no longer is altruistic 
act, which could lead to lower total donation rates (Titmuss 1970, p.157). This 
crowding out hypothesis is supported by a Swedish paper, in which a field exper-
iment on donors and different types of incentives were introduced which saw de-
crease of female donors drop to almost half when monetary incentive was intro-
duced (Mellström and Johannesson 2008, p.857). 
 
3 Main points of the study were done by comparing blood transfusion systems of US (commercial 
system) and UK (voluntary donor system) with large data, while other countries data were less 
encompassing. 
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2.2 The Obligations That Bind 
As Titmuss pointed out, blood collected from people who give it out of altruistic 
motivation seems to be of more high quality than blood from paid donations. 
However, since Titmuss released his book in 1970 lot has changed. In addition to 
supplying blood to those in need, blood donation has related to more functions. 
As Mauss theorised, the gift could bind people together, and Titmuss further 
claimed that the gift of blood could bind a society together. In the following 
sections I examine three different cases that each in their own way exemplify the 
workings of a gift relationship in blood donation. This brief case study is based 
on cases that all garnered wide public uproar on their own. Because the view of 
the gift as a basis of blood donation sees the public and the recipients of blood as 
bound by gift relationship, these shocks reveal how the logic of the gift in blood 
donation functions. These cases were uncovered by literature review.  
2.2.1 Poison That Seeps Through Market and Gift Alike 
HIV, or Human Immunodeficiency Virus, shook transfusion systems across the 
western world. As Mauss stated in The Gift the other semantic meaning for the 
word ‘gift’ in Germanic languages was poison (Mauss 1999, pp.109–10). The dif-
ferent kinds of systems that operated the systems were wholly unprepared for the 
new threat. In retrospect, comparing how they reacted reveals where the respon-
sibilities and obligations between the participants of the relation lie. Healy studied 
how American blood collecting system reacted and how that exemplified the gift 
relation in blood donation. American blood transfusion system is great to compare 
different types of systems of exchanges, since at the time in the early to late 1980s, 
it consisted of two separate systems: non-remunerated blood donation and for-
profit plasma sector. (Healy 2010, pp.88, 93.) One could say that the system of 
exchange in blood and blood components consisted two separate economies: one 
based on the gift and one in market exchange (Farrugia and Starr 2016, p.225). 
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When the evidence of AIDS4 being linked to blood donation started mounting, 
both systems received the same information. January 1983 CDC (Centres for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention) committee released their report both to plasma 
banks and blood donation system. The report urged to limit risk groups, including 
people with AIDS, gay men, haemophiliacs, intravenous drug users, and Haitians 
outside of any type of blood donation. (Schmidt 2011, p.339.) CDC proposed that 
surrogate test should be used to limit risk groups, since they had found that 80% 
of people diagnosed of AIDS had hepatitis B as well, so the same test could be 
applied to HIV screening (Bayer 1999, p.24). 
The representatives of the blood donation system uniformly responded to CDC 
that they were not going to use the precautions proposed by CDC against the gay 
population, as the deed would be unnecessary, discriminatory, and costly. Gay 
men consisted of 15% of their donor population, because blood donation had 
emerged as an outlet for them to help society that discriminated them. The blood 
banks were linked in a gift relationship with these donors and this relationship 
affected how blood banks reacted. Fittingly, the blood banks had no problem 
limiting blood donation from the Haitians as they were not engaged in this rela-
tionship. However, the blood banks decided not to forbid gay men from donating. 
The blood banks did not wish to question the gift given to them (Healy 2010 
pp.94, 102). According to estimates, 29,000 were infected from blood supplied to 
hospitals by blood banks, of which half are believed to have been contracted after 
CDC gave their recommendations (Bayer 1999, p.33). The American system that 
was reorganised after Titmuss’ book emphasised that voluntary, non-remunerated 
donors donated blood that was pure. However, the system spread contaminated 
blood instead.  
 
4 HIV was at the time unknown and AIDS (the disease caused by HIV) was the only indicator for 
contradiction. 
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Contrary to blood banks, the plasma fractioning industry took the recommenda-
tions by CDC seriously. Even as they had a relationship between them and the 
people they collected blood from, the industry could more easily widen their donor 
population with monetary compensation. In addition, the plasma factioneers were 
deeply embedded in a relationship between them and their main customers, the 
haemophiliacs, who bought from them medicine made from fractioned blood com-
ponents. (Healy 2010, pp.103-104.) Blood plasma had just recently been processed 
into plasma-derived factor that revolutionised the lives of haemophiliacs: other-
wise crippling and deadly disease could be treated with the derivate and the pa-
tients were able to live normal lives (Feldman and Bayer 1999, p.1). Even as the 
gay community and blood banks criticised the factioneers decision to limit gay 
men, the companies felt that it was more important to protect their customers 
than to please other members of the relationship (Healy 2010, p.104). 
The commercial interests held by the companies guided their decision when con-
fronted by new information differently than the blood banks and their gift rela-
tionship. This, however, did not protect the customers of the companies from the 
contamination spreading through the country. According to Healy, the same mar-
ket mechanisms that helped companies react better than the blood banks in the 
end caused the spread of HIV (Healy 2010, p.105). In processing of the plasma to 
coagulation agents used as medicine, even as much as tens of thousands of units 
of plasma were combined. This meant that even a single HIV-positive donor could 
potentially contaminate the whole batch of anti-coagulation medicine. (Feldman 
and Bayer 1999, p.3.) 
Even before the CDC report the companies knew that many of their customers 
had contracted the disease. After the report was released, they reacted quickly 
and implemented a new and more safe way of processing the components. How-
ever, they did not destroy the inventory that they had already processed, and 
instead, sold it to the patients. (Healy 2010, pp.105-106.) Because the US plasma 
fractioning industry dominated the world market, this meant that tens of 
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thousands of haemophiliacs were infected. Of the patients receiving these coagu-
lation agents, approximately 75-85% were infected. Whole families were affected, 
as couples infected their spouses and mothers giving birth infected their babies. 
(Bayer 1999, p.33; Feldman and Bayer 1999, p.3.) 
Neither of these systems were able to escape this horrific situation without, from 
the retrospect, unnecessary infections and unsurmountable grief. The organisa-
tions made their decisions at a time of uncertain information based on the rela-
tionship and the obligations related to them: one based on gift relationship and 
the other based on market relationship. 
2.2.2 L’ affaire du Sang Contaminé 
Of all European countries, France was most affected by the HIV. Approximately 
60% of infections in Europe occurred in France, and dozens of high ranking were 
later charged in court in the case that was later known as the case of the contam-
inated blood. (Steffen 1999, p.96.) What could have caused such a significant 
share of infections in France, the home country of Mauss? 
Compared to the American system, French system was very different in the early 
1980s. It rested wholly on the principle of non-remuneration, and any profitmak-
ing with blood or blood components was strictly forbidden. The system was self-
sufficient and national, which was considered a guarantee of purity. After the test 
for hepatitis B introduced in 1976 all screening of donors was removed. They 
switched from screening of people before donation, to purely biological screening, 
which meant that anyone could donate blood. (Steffen 1999, pp.99–100.) It is 
likely, that Titmuss’ results had strengthened the belief in purity of donated 
blood. But especially devastating to the spread of HIV was the notion, that the 
gift of blood donation binds people together and integrates them into society.  
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Prisons had been in France discovered as good places to collect blood. The pris-
oners were able to benefit society by donating blood, and it was considered a way 
to integrate them back into society. With one visit, blood banks could fill their 
stocks, as the prisoners were more than happy to break the monotony of prison 
sentence with blood donation. (Steffen 1999, p.105.) At the same time, the war 
against drugs had filled prisons with intravenous drug users, who were major risk 
group regarding HIV infections (Steffen 1999, pp.97-98). The belief in the purity 
of donated blood together with the notion of the integrating effect of the gift 
relationship resulted into taking risk groups into the donor pool. While in Tit-
muss’ time hepatitis B was the most serious of the threats in blood, after the test 
to screen it was developed, the gift relationship finally could be universal, but 
national. It was the French blood, one that connected all the people in France 
together, no matter what they had done or what colour was their skin. 
Even as prisoners consisted only 0.5% of the whole donor population, the infec-
tions caused by the blood collected from them amounted to up to 25% of all 
infections in France (Steffen 1999, p.106). While in the US infections caused by 
blood donation were relatively small portion of the whole infections, in France the 
belief of pure blood and the integrating force of it was the cause of large amount 
of infections. According to Godbout and Caillé (2005, p.55), had Titmuss com-
pared French and US systems he might have concluded that the monetary system 
was better even prior of HIV. The French system was a patchwork of different 
kinds of systems of which the centralised English system would have probably 
trumped in all regards. It should be noted, however, that the French system did 
succeed in one way: it collected a lot of blood from a lot of people. In 1993, 44% 
of French of eligible age had donated blood which was the highest share in EU 
(Healy 2010, p.73). One might argue that the gift relationship succeeded in bind-
ing the people together, at least until the gift carried a lethal disease.  
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2.2.3 Donation as a Remedy for Devastated Nation 
The terror attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington resulted in nearly 3000 
casualties and left approximately 4000 injured, of which 200 required hospital 
care. Americans reacted in a heartfelt and concrete way: they donated blood to 
help the victims. (Schmidt 2002, p.617; Starr 2002, p.13.) Thousands of donors 
lined to donate blood to the victims in need of help, and the images of the lines 
shown in television screens symbolised unity of the nation (Starr 2002, p.14). In 
the three months following the attacks, approximately 572,000 more units of blood 
was collected than what is usual in reference period. In truth, however, the victims 
of the attacks received 258 units of blood, none of which were donated after the 
attack. (Glynn et al. 2003, p.2246; Schmidt 2002, p.618.) Because blood has short 
shelf-life, one estimate states that 300,000 units of blood were discarded and as 
the discussion of this was public, the donation rates dropped for a long time to 
lower than before the attacks (Korcok 2002, p.907; Sass 2013, p.38). 
Even as blood banks all over the country were overflooding with donors, only few 
of them asked donors to leave and return later. On the contrary, the blood banks 
increased the resources for collecting blood by moving employees from other re-
sponsibilities to collecting and screening the donors, in the expense of testing the 
blood and other supporting roles in handling it. The American Red Cross even 
established a special donating spot in Washington DC, in which politicians could 
donate blood and received a video of the occasion. (Schmidt 2002, p.618; Starr 
2002, p.14.) To the politicians, this was an opportunity to indicate their solidarity 
with the victims, which they naturally wanted to show to voters. At the same 
time, however, the processing of some blood products did not function as required. 
Why did the blood banks not ask the donors to leave and return in a few months, 
when there was again demand for blood? Donors felt that they were giving the 
gift of blood directly to the victims of the attacks, and blood as a universal symbol 
of life gave the donors means to help them concretely (Sass 2013, p.40). As a 
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symbol of national unification, blood donation was one of the few ways people 
could assist the victims (Schmidt 2002, p.617). Starr recounts a situation, in that 
employees of one blood bank urged the lines of donors that only those that have 
the universally usable O negative blood type would stay, and the rest would leave. 
However, not a single donor left the line. (Starr 2002, p.14) To the donors, the 
gift relationship was evidently strong and obligatory5. The petitions Red Cross 
and the government gave the people attached the people into this relationship, a 
relationship that had binding obligations along with it. The gift served as a rem-
edy to heal the wounded nation, in a way that its was the only concrete thing 
many felt they could do. 
In an interesting fashion, the reaction of American blood banks reminds that of a 
potlach, which Mauss spoke of, of how the chiefs of archaic tribes consumed the 
benefits they had received in an overflowing fashion, to create more obligations 
and create more gift relationships and to get more followers (Mauss 1999, p.125). 
In the same way, the blood banks urging people to become donors was a way to 
get more people participating the gift relationship even if it was clear that there 
was no additional need for blood, which led eventually to the destruction of vast 
amounts of biologically hazardous matter that the untested blood had become. 
The employees of the blood banks were extremely disappointed that only a small 
portion of the new donors reached during this period returned to give blood 
(Glynn et al. 2003, p.2251). Glynn et al. speculate that the discussion this matter 
received after the destruction of the blood angered and confused these donors, 
who felt that the gift they gave was not appreciated of (2003, pp.2246–2247). 
 
5 Not obligatory in the sense that someone enforced it, but obligatory for the donor in relation to 
the imagined recipient of the blood, who in this case were the victims. 
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2.2.4 Who Should the Relationship Serve?  
In all of the cases mentioned before, the most important part of the gift of blood 
was in some way forgotten: the recipient of the blood, namely the patient. The 
risk when making blood donation into a gift made by a mystified altruist is that 
they are and cannot be part of the blood donation. Therefore, when something 
bad happens they are the ones who pay the price. If the relationship serves the 
donor and the organisation that collects the blood it carries the risk of the system 
turning against itself. A Maussian gift has three parts: giving the gift, receiving 
it, and reciprocating it. As gift in blood donation the patient is not the one re-
ceiving, instead the organisation that collects it receive the gift. These cases show 
that when the gift relationship in blood donation is too important, the patient 
may be the one who suffers. These cases also showed how the donation of blood 
is not just something that is donated, rather it is collected.  
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3 BLOOD COLLECTION REGIMES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Even as blood transfusion is being constantly standardised by European Commis-
sion through directives (cf. Hossenlopp 2005b; Faber, Boulton, and Rouger 2005; 
Toumi et al. 2015), the responsibility and organisation of blood collection remain 
the responsibility of each Member State (Hossenlopp 2005a, pp.75–76). Thus, 
among Member States blood and blood component collection is being carried out 
by variety of different types of organisations, such as nonprofit associations, for-
profit corporations, and state-owned enterprises. In this thesis I demonstrate how 
these different kinds of organisations engage donors in a variety of ways. In each 
country donation of blood stand for diverse meanings, emerging from the culture 
of the Member State and sometimes from accidents of history. 
The different ways in which blood collecting organisations engage donors is most 
evidently seen from the percentage of adult population that has ever donated 
blood. For best possible comparison (because of the variation in countries self-
reported data) I use Eurobarometer survey collected in 2014 that consisted of all 
28 European Union Member States (EC 2018). In Table 1 the average of each 
Member States percentage of population that has ever given blood is presented. 
Age has been restricted between 18 and 65, because that is the most common age 
restriction for blood donation (WHO 2012, pp.39–40). Figure 1. shows the same 
information mapped geographically. Donation rates vary from as high as roughly 
50% of Austria, Cyprus, and France, while in Portugal only 23% have ever given 
blood. The total average of blood donation in European Union is 38.3%. 
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Table 1. Share of respondents who have ever given blood, ages 18-65 
 
Blood collection and safety is directed by European Union by number of directives 
(cf. EC 2016). However, European countries have responded to the challenge of 
adequate blood supply in different ways. For many European countries the incep-
tion of blood collection occurred during times of conflict, mainly the Second World 
War (Leikola 2004, 33). After the war some countries (such as Finland) gave the 
responsibility of blood collection to Red Cross while other countries integrated 
blood donation to public health system. 
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Figure 1. Share of blood donors across the EU, ages 18-65 
3.1 Blood Collecting Regimes 
Kieran Healy (2000) first introduced blood collection regimes to explain the cross-
national variation of blood donation in Europe. He distinguished three main blood 
collection regimes and theorised the ways in which characteristics of collection 
organisations might affect the type of donors they recruit. First regime is state 
system, in which state has monopoly on blood collection. In state systems the 
collection of blood is usually in proximity (both conceptually and geographically) 
of state-run health care system, and the collection of blood is often performed at 
public hospitals. Examples of such countries are France and UK. Second is Red 
Cross regime which is characterised by a monopoly or a clear majority of Red 
Cross in donor collection organisations. Red Cross is private non-profit 
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organisation it does not collect at hospitals, but as a large and recognisable or-
ganisation it is quite efficient in blood procurement. Some examples of Red Cross 
countries are Finland and Austria. Third regime is blood bank regime. It is char-
acterised by variety of different organisations and donor engagement strategies 
both nationally and between countries. (Healy 2000, pp.1638–40.) 
Furthermore, state regime is characterised by a high level of centralisation and a 
single organisation that in the end is usually responsible for the whole chain of 
collection and supply of blood. State run blood services are more prevalent in 
countries that have extensive state-run healthcare services. The reason behind 
this is mainly that the demand for blood increased simultaneously healthcare sys-
tems were developing. In countries with highly expanded public health services it 
becomes easier to develop blood services that function near the health organisa-
tions. However, some countries that do have extensive public health service have 
seen the strong effect of path dependency. For example, in Finland public health 
system is wide ranging but the blood service is operated by the Finnish Red Cross 
that took the responsibility for it from Boy Scouts led blood alliance during the 
Second World War. After the war and during the expansion of the health system 
there were talks of who was to operate the system, but since the times were scarse 
and budgets tight the responsibility was given to Red Cross. (Leikola 2004, pp.53–
55.) 
Blood bank regime is quite different from state regime. In blood bank countries 
the system consists of many different organisations that may have state given 
regional monopoly but recruit donors and collect blood in a variety of ways. These 
countries also have the most variation in donor prevalence, as the uncentralised 
system is a patchwork of systems that are inefficient compared to state and Red 
Cross systems. Also, different kinds of volunteer donor organisations are prevalent 
in blood bank countries, for example in Italy which has four major volunteer 
organisations (AVIS, FIDAS, FRATRES, CRI) that are highly involved in col-
lection of blood and the recruitment of donors (EBA 2019). This also affects the 
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kinds of people that donate blood, as the organisations may be associated with 
other volunteer or even nationalistic associations. 
In Red Cross regime countries, the local Red Cross has the monopoly or a majority 
in collection and recruitment of donors. Large internationally known organisation 
is nationally well centralised and employs national campaigns to recruit donors. 
This makes them quite efficient in receiving donations of blood, but it also affects 
who the donors are. Blood donation in Red Cross countries is somewhat linked to 
religiosity (Healy 2000, pp.1649-1650). 
Some countries have a mix of state and other systems, for example the military 
may have its own blood service while civilians donate to Red Cross or independent 
blood banks. Additionally, some countries have a mix of non-remunerated and 
paid blood donation.  
The most important aspects of the regimes regarding donor populations are how 
and where the donors are recruited. These can be studied in a variety of ways, 
from the characteristics of donors to the prevalence of repeat donors. For example, 
we should expect that state system blood collectors have close ties to other state 
led organisations - such as health services - should have high prevalence of donors 
from more diverse parts of the society and higher overall donor share. However, 
this does not mean state systems have the most donations.  
After Healy analysed European blood collection regimes with data collected in 
1994, the number of countries in European Union has expanded from the 13 he 
covered (12 EU countries and Norway) to 28 Member States in the decades fol-
lowing Healy’s study.6 In this thesis I expand the blood collection regimes to the 
 
6 At the time of writing this thesis Great Britain was exiting the EU in a lengthy process widely 
known as Brexit (cf. Clarke et al. 2017). However, this does not affect this study as the data was 
collected before the process began. 
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new Member States and examine if the findings Healy made are still valid, and if 
these regimes still hold. 
In this section I present how countries were divided into regimes. I use variety of 
sources, from European Blood Alliance web pages to journal articles, reports, and 
books. First, I address the countries Healy covered, and second, I will explain how 
other countries were divided. I begin by introducing countries that I have organ-
ised into the three different regimes introduced earlier.  
However, as EU has expanded it is expected that new countries are harder to 
divide. This can occur for many reasons. It may be that in the country in question 
there has not been much research on how blood collection is organised, at least in 
English. Also, in most of the countries blood donation is only meant for citizens 
of the country who speak the official language. This means that in many cases, 
all the material meant for potential donors is in that language. It would be quite 
outside of the scope of this thesis to familiarise myself with so many languages, 
so I am tied only to the one I am familiar with. Even if specific studies considering 
the institutional basis of blood donation exists, it might be difficult to utilize them 
for comparative purposes.  
3.1.1 State Regime 
In France blood collection is and has been a state-run business. Since 2000 France 
has had only a single organisation, the Etablissement Français du Sang, respon-
sible for the whole transfusion chain and monopoly in collection of blood in each 
of the provinces, including those that locate overseas (Stenholm 2015, p.11; 
Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.65; EBA 2019 “France”). This is a major over-
haul from the old patchwork system supposedly because the outrage that the 
system received after the spread of HIV in the French blood supply (cf. Steffen 
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1999). Because state led organisation is wholly responsible for the collection of 
blood, France thus falls into the state regime. 
Regarding Healys’ study of blood collection regimes, the Netherlands is an inter-
esting case. When Healy studied the 1994 Eurobarometer, Red Cross had monop-
oly on collection of blood in the Netherlands (Healy 2000, 1639). However, now-
adays the responsibility has been given to a single state approved organisation, 
Sanquin (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, 72–73). This makes the Netherlands the 
only country in which the regime has changed since the previous study. If Healy’s 
hypothesis on the explanatory force of the regimes regarding donor population, 
we should expect some kind of shift in the population. However, this may be hard 
to reach with the data in question, since we are unable to distinguish those who 
have given before and after the regime shift. Even so, this might be an interesting 
thing to study in the future and would be possible to study with Eurobarometer 
data that has asked about blood donation periodically. According to Gorham & 
MacPherson (2018, p.46), the Netherlands blood programme most resembles that 
of France and UK. Thus, departing from Healy’s study, I categorise the Nether-
lands into the state regime instead of Red Cross regime. 
The United Kingdom has four blood transfusion services in each of the four coun-
tries, England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, (EBA 2019 “United King-
dom”) that it comprises. They are, however, coordinated from a single authority 
and are located and administrated close to public health services. Similarly, Ire-
land has a state-run system that has a single organisation responsible entirely for 
the collection and recruitment of donors (EBA 2019 “Ireland”; Gorham and Mac-
Pherson 2018, p.69). 
Latvia has state run system that has blood banks in hospitals, but has Red Cross 
assisting in donor recruitment (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.71; EBA 2019 
“Latvia”). Latvia has relatively large proportion of donors at 41.7%. Latvia does 
not have donor associations, and the system, like most of those in Europe, only 
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encounters slight shortages during holiday season (Turek et al. 2005, p.244). Be-
cause of the high state influence on all aspects of blood collection, Latvia seems 
to resemble France and thus belongs to state regime. 
 
3.1.2 Blood Banks Regime 
In Denmark blood collection is divided into five blood bank organisations that 
have complete responsibility and monopoly in each region. Blood banks operate 
in proximity to the hospitals they supply, and their size depends on the need for 
transfusions in each hospital, and there is no national level coordination of the 
transfusion service. (Stenholm 2015, p.6.) It should be also noted that Denmark 
has widespread volunteer donor organisation “The Blood Donors in Denmark” 
that is divided into 66 different local volunteer organisations (Gorham 2018, p.63). 
These organisations supply hospitals with donors, and in reciprocal manner, the 
hospitals pay these organisations a fee to fund publicity of donation for recruit-
ment (Healy 2010, p.75). Even as the state has approved regional monopoly of 
blood establishments (EBA 2019, “Denmark”), Denmark still falls into the regime 
of blood banks because the recruitment of donors is not centralised under a single 
organisation but multiple different organisations. 
In Greece the National Blood Centre is responsible for supplying blood, but the 
blood is collected in hospitals (Kalargirou et al. 2014, p.320). Even with single 
organisation in charge of parts of the supply, the system in Greece is decentralised 
and hospital-based blood banking system (EBA 2019, “Greece”). Collection and 
recruitment of donors falls mostly to the responsibility of hospital blood banks. 
Thus, Greece falls into the blood banks regime. One interesting fact about Greece 
in relation to most EU countries is that roughly 50% of the blood supply is from 
family or replacement donors. Replacement donors are blood donors who are 
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recruited by hospitals to replace the blood that was given to patient. These re-
placement donors may be family members or friends of the patient that received 
blood, or even the patient themselves after they have recovered. This type of 
blood donation is considered inconsistent with the principle of voluntary non-
remunerated donor (EC 2016, 6; WHO 2010, 15). This is because in some cases 
the patient may be paying the donor, even if the hospital is not. Also, in some 
cases, the hospital may charge more for the blood if no replacement donation is 
made. This also shapes the donor population: it crowds out the altruistic donors, 
as Titmuss might argue. Interestingly, Greece is also one of the countries that has 
regular shortages in red blood cells (EC 2016, 13). 
Spain also has a very decentralised system at least from the perspective of blood 
collection. Supply is quite centralised, but the collection and recruitment are car-
ried out by a variety of organisations. (EBA 2019, “Spain”.) The system consists 
of national programme but is in the responsibility of regional organisations [fa-
ber2002haemovigilance; faber2004worldwide]. The 17 Autonomous Communities 
(AC) in Spain have their own public blood programme that are all authorised by 
the regional governments (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, 76; Stenholm 2015, 
28). It also seems Red Cross holds no major part in blood collection even if there 
are other major donor organisations (Mascaretti et al. 2004), except in Madrid 
where Red Cross operates a programme in addition to the publicly run programme 
(Gorham and MacPherson 2018, 76). Thus, just like in Healys’ study, Spain be-
longs to the blood banking regime. 
Blood collection in Italy consists of 21 regional blood centers that have a monop-
oly in the area and are responsible for related local networks of blood collection 
units. Italy also has major volunteer donor organisations that are deeply involved 
in the recruitment of donors and the collection of blood. (EBA 2019, “Italy”; 
Stenholm 2015, 20.) In some cases, volunteer organisations even manage their own 
transfusion centers, and the fees collected from selling the blood to hospitals are 
used to fund campaigns (Bani and Strepparava 2011, 642). Some regions operate 
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at high efficacy, but there is a lot of variation between them (Alfieri 2017, 723). 
Italy thus belongs, like in Healy’s study, to blood banks regime. 
Portugal has a system in which a large state led organisation operates approxi-
mately 60% of the blood supply, while the rest is mostly collected by hospital 
blood banks (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, 73–74). The system is in the process 
of merging and centralisation, with the Portuguese Institute of Blood and Trans-
plantation collecting approximately 60% of the blood with the rest collected by 
hospital blood banks (EBA 2019, “Portugal”). This makes Portugal fall into the 
blood banks regime. Portugal also had the lowest percentage of donors in Healy’s 
study at 16% in 1994 (2000, 1638), which has increased to 25.7% in 2014 according 
to my analysis. Still, Portugal is in the last place in all EU countries, including 
the ones that have joined since Healy’s study. Additionally, blood transfusion 
system in Portugal sees regular shortages in red blood cells (EC 2016, 13). 
Bulgaria is an interesting country in that it has a national blood programme that 
has quite high percentage of people that have donated (39%) but seems to have 
insufficient supply of blood. Bulgarian system regularly has shortages of red blood 
cells (EC 2016, 13). High reliance in replacement donors is clear in Bulgaria, and 
with no funds allotted for promotional work it is hard to reach more diverse donor 
base (WHO 2007, 86–87). Bulgaria has a problem of a black market in the trade 
of blood, and hospitals are unable to get blood to patients and instead urge pa-
tient’s relatives and friends to find the blood themselves. Because of the insuffi-
cient supply of blood black market dealers have contacts that are waiting for a 
call from the dealer, after which the contact with the specific blood type goes to 
a legitimate blood bank and receives payment from the dealer, who receives pay-
ment from the relative. (Toshkov 2011.) In addition to this, Bulgaria also heavily 
does work with the Bulgarian Red Cross in donor recruitment (WHO 2007, 56). 
In any case, Bulgaria is one of the countries that are hard to pinpoint into which 
blood collection regime it belongs to, but I categorise it as belonging to blood 
banks regime. 
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Croatia has the blood collection as part of the national health system. The Croa-
tian Red Cross, together with blood services, bear responsibility for recruitment 
of donors (WHO 2007, pp.56, 86, 93). However, it seems not to be that centralised, 
as the largest transfusion institution collects 50% of all blood (Vuk et al. 2012, 
p.432). This indicates that Croatia is a blood banks regime country. 
Cyprus is, like Bulgaria, an interesting case in that it has encountered shortages 
in blood supply (EC 2016, p.13), but has quite high rate of donations at 53.3%. 
Cyprus as a small country seems to have some centralisation, but still seems quite 
uncentralised. Compared to Finland, for example, Cyprus has as of 2013 five cen-
ters that prepare blood component compared to that of one in Finland (World 
Health Organization 2017, p.129). With the large gap in the countries’ population 
this would indicate quite a decentralised system. This points toward blood bank-
ing regime. 
The blood collection system in the Czech Republic consists of diverse system, in 
which the collection of blood is hospital based with some centralisation, and the 
ownership of hospitals is diverse (Turek et al. 2005, pp.233–34; Zimová and Turek 
2006, p.408; Mascaretti et al. 2004, p.107). With one of the lowest shares of donors 
in the EU (30.3%), Czhecia with its diverse hospital-based system clearly belongs 
to blood bank regime. 
Hungary had until 1998 a diverse hospital-based system, which was reorganized 
with the aim towards centralisation and autonomy from the hospitals. The system 
is regionally operated with monopolies in each area. Red Cross also has major 
part in organisation and recruitment of donors. (Turek et al. 2005, pp.237–38.) 
According to EBA website approximately 400,000 donations take place annually 
(EBA 2019 “Hungary”), and according to Hungarian Red Cross they recruit an-
nually 460,000 donors (HRC 2019). This would mean that Red Cross recruits 
most of the donors in Hungary even if Red Cross is not responsible for the whole 
chain of transfusion. Hungary also deals with regular shortages of red blood cells 
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(EC 2016, 13). The system is quite diverse, so even it is being centralised, I cate-
gorise it as blood banks regime. 
The Maltese islands consists by population a small country with circa 430,000 
people. Malta has relatively low share of donors in eligible population at 35%. 
Hospital blood banks and donation sites are all are managed by the Ministry of 
Health, and as such, Malta falls into the blood banks regime. (EBA 2019 “Malta”; 
Turek et al. 2005, p.250; Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.72.) 
Romania has a state operated system but has regular shortages (Gorham and 
MacPherson 2018, p.74). Romania some talks have been started to involve Red 
Cross to have a work in donor procurement (WHO 2007, p.56), but seems like 
they do not hold major part in recruiting donors. State led 42 independent blood 
establishments and 330 blood banks answer to one authority (WHO 2007, p.27), 
which does seem to point more towards blood banking regime than state regime.  
In Sweden the blood system is regionally divided into six organisations with hos-
pital-based donation. The university hospitals are the main coordinating organi-
sations and cooperate with regions organisation for promotion and other activities. 
(Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.77.) In the 1980s Sweden’s regime would have 
clearly been blood banks regime (Berner 2011, p.388). Seems that quite a bit of 
centralisation has taken place as promotional material for blood donation in Swe-
den all seem to come from same source. However, behind the first page of their 
promotional webpage is 20 different provinces with their own webpages. (Swedish 
Blood Alliance 2019.) So even if there has been quite a bit of centralisation, Swe-
den still falls into the category of blood banks. Interestingly, Sweden is the only 
country in the Northern EU countries to face regular shortages in red blood cells 
specifically in larger cities, shortages that the system has been able to cover with 
collaboration with other provinces in Sweden (EC 2016). This underlines the claim 
that Sweden belongs to blood bank regime, since in centralised countries this 
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would not be considered a shortage, for the collaboration between regions is given, 
not an exception. 
Poland has two blood services: one for civilians and one for uniformed forces. 
There are 21 independently managed regional centers that are responsible for the 
whole chain of blood donation. Promotion is regional but there are some national 
level campaigns like the honorary blood donor promotion. There is also a lot of 
variation in blood donation between these regions. (Ojrzyńska and Twaróg 2012, 
pp.178, 181, 187.) The system seems to be undergoing heavy centralisation 
(Stenholm 2015, p.25), but it is still in process. However, it is stated that blood 
transfusion in Poland is integral part of the public health service and that Polish 
Red Cross works in cooperation with Blood Donor Association (Turek et al. 2005, 
pp.250–51). This would point to a mixed system like in Spain. All these facts 
combined suggest that Poland belongs to blood banks regime even if the state has 
major part in the organisation of blood collection. 
Lithuania is one country that explicitly states that donors are paid money for the 
donations, a payment of equal to 12 Euro. In 2015 the share of paid donors was 
approximately 15% of the whole supply (EBA 2019, “Lithuania”), which has 
dropped considerably from 2004, when paid donors comprised approximately 88%. 
In the Soviet period blood donation in Lithuania was wholly based on paid donors. 
After independence Lithuania passed a number of laws that tied compensation 
for blood donation to the salary they received, which flooded the system with 
high-income donors. (Buciuniene et al. 2006, 165.) The public institute is the 
largest in Lithuania and comprises of more than 70% of all blood collected (EBA 
2019, “Lithuania”), and presumably collects from all the non-remunerated donors. 
However, as the rest is collected by variety of hospital blood banks, I categorise 
Lithuania into the blood banks regime. 
Slovenia has regional system that is not funded by the government. Blood is 
collected in hospital blood banks and transfusion centers, with centralisation in 
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the process as of 2005. Red Cross primarily organises donation sessions, but the 
exact number of these sessions can only be estimated. The collection is not wholly 
organised by Red Cross, but mostly by hospital blood banks. No donor organisa-
tions are present. (Turek et al. 2005, 258–61.) It has a hospital-based system with 
somewhat deep centralisation, like Italy (Mascaretti et al. 2004, 107). Thus, Slo-
venia would most fittingly be categorised into the blood banks regime. 
In Estonia unpaid blood donation has been introduced in the 1990s (Abolgasemi, 
Hosseini-Divkalayi, and Seighali 2010, 9). During the Soviet period the system 
was based on paid donation (Buciuniene et al. 2006, 165), but contrary to Lithu-
ania, after independency Estonia steered for non-remunerated system. There are 
four major separated blood centers merged into hospitals (EBA 2019, “Estonia”). 
This points towards blood banking regime. 
In Slovak Republic blood donation is performed at hospital blood banks. Even 
small hospitals have their own blood banks, which has led to some problems. As 
of 2005 10% of whole blood collected is transfused to patients without being pro-
cessed due to financial difficulties within the system. The system was, however, 
going through major transformation while still facing major financial issues. (Tu-
rek et al. 2005, 256–58.) However, Slovakia does not report regular shortages to 
the European Commission (EC 2016, 13). I was unable to find other relevant 
information regards Slovakian blood collection system but am quite confident it 
should be placed into the blood banks regime. 
3.1.3 Red Cross Regime  
In Belgium blood is collected by two different sections of Red Cross. As a country 
in which language is one of the main political and ideological dynamics (cf. Blom-
maert 2011), it is fitting that this is evident also in collection of blood, as the two 
sections are Flemish speaking (Flanders) Red Cross and French speaking 
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(Wallonian) Red Cross. Each have centralized both collection of blood and re-
cruitment of the donors in their respective language areas. (EBA 2019 “Belgium”; 
Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.62.) Just like in Healy’s analysis, Belgium be-
longs to the Red Cross regime. 
At the time Healy wrote his piece, Germany was a system in which Red Cross 
held an unknown majority but also had a mix of private blood banks that even 
paid for blood (Healy 2000, pp.1639–40). The market share of private collection 
organisations has increased from 2% to 7% (Mews 2013, p.193), and it seems some 
organisations still pay for blood (EC 2016, p.8). Nevertheless, Red Cross is still 
responsible for approximately 80% of the blood collected according to Weidmann 
and Klüter (2013). However, more recent report by Gorham and MacPherson 
found that German Red Cross is responsible for 70% of the supply, while 15% is 
collected by university or municipality hospital blood banks and military blood 
programme (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, pp.66–67). Interestingly this leaves 
15% unaccounted for, which then must be collected by commercial blood banks. 
There are 26 commercial blood centers that pay for blood or blood components 
in Germany (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.67). Germany seems today the 
same as when Healy discussed of it: A mixed system with rare (at least in Europe) 
renumeration for donors. However, as Red Cross holds a clear majority, Germany 
falls into the Red Cross regime. 
In Finland Red Cross has been the single centralised operator of the blood pro-
gramme since 1948 (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, p.64). They are in responsi-
bility for the whole chain from recruiting donors to testing and delivering the 
blood to hospitals (EBA 2019 “Finland”). Finland also has completely centralised 
system (World Health Organization 2017, p.129; Stenholm 2015, p.17) that Red 
Cross operates. Finland is one of the clearest cases of Red Cross regime countries, 
as Red Cross holds a monopoly in blood collection and all activity related to it. 
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In Luxembourg Red Cross oversees the single blood center. This also consists the 
whole of the country’s blood programme. (EBA 2019, “Luxembourg”). As a small 
country single center is enough to supply the whole country with blood. Since 
Red Cross has a monopoly Luxembourg belongs to the Red Cross regime. 
90% of blood collected in Austria is collected by Red Cross (EBA 2019, “Austria”), 
so it should go into the Red Cross regime. In Austria it is also possible to receive 
payment for donation of blood (EC 2016, p.9), but it is difficult to say to what 
extend these payments are made. At least in the case of Red Cross, it is hard to 
believe they would pay for blood, and so it is likely that the for-profit organisa-
tions are the ones paying donors. At least the plasma sector in Austria pays for 
donors, and the Austrian Red Cross sells 50,000 liters of plasma recover from 
fractioning to these commercial fractionators (Gorham and MacPherson 2018, 
p.61). It has also been reported that Austrian private plasma establishments have 
been collecting plasma from Hungarian and Slovakian donors that have crossed 
the border to sell their plasma (EC 2016, p.7). It is hard to say what kind of effect 
the payment for blood would have on the donor population. This might be ap-
proached in the future by examining blood donors and plasma donors separately, 
which is possible with the Eurobarometer data. Austria has the highest proportion 
of donors in this study at 53.4%. One explanation to this might be that Austria 
has conscription army that works in collaboration with the local Red Cross. The 
army allows donors to leave earlier for the weekend (Costa-Font, Jofre-Bonet and 
Yen 2013, p.548), so there is clear incentive for donation for a lot of people. 
3.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Blood Collection Regimes 
In figure 2 the countries are divided into regimes and the share of donors is pre-
sented. The blood banks regime is the biggest of the groups with 18 countries. 
Red Cross and state regimes are tied with 5 countries each. There are 16 countries 
that I categorized not covered by Healy, and one country that I categorised 
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differently than Healy. By looking at the distribution of countries according to 
the share of donors, it looks like blood banks regime has the most variation, from 
Cyprus’ 53% to Portugal’s 23%. Except for Cyprus, Greece, and Slovenia in the 
top, the countries in the blood banks regime are distributed quite uniformly. In 
the blood banks regime, the total share of donors (calculated with population 
weight) across the regime is 36.3%, the lowest of the regimes. The Red Cross 
regime comes second, with the total share of donors being 40.9%. The highest 
share of donors is in state regime with 41.8% of the population in the regime that 
are donors. 
 
Figure 2. Share of donors across countries divided into regimes. 
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4 STUDY DESIGN 
 
4.1 Research Questions 
As presented in the Introduction, the research questions of this thesis are: 
1. Can blood donation be considered as a unique gift relationship? 
2. Are the blood collection regimes applicable to the expanded EU, and what 
are the role of regimes to the gift relationship in blood donation? 
3. What are the characteristics of blood donor population in the EU? 
 
The first question, which was already explored in Chapter 2, is examined further 
with quantitative methods when blood donation is compared with other types of 
giving behaviour Chapter 5. If blood donation is just another type of gift, it should 
be closely related to other kinds of giving behaviour. However, if blood donation 
is a unique gift relationship, it should influence why people donate blood and how 
they consider people part of the gift relationship and those who are outside of the 
relationship. 
As was shown in chapter 2, institutions have a major impact on who donate. This 
is what the second research question relates to. The main function of the institu-
tion of blood donation is supplying blood to those in need. However, different 
ways of organising supply and collection and have major impact on what kind of 
people donate blood. The blood collection regimes expanded to cover all 28 EU 
countries presented in Chapter 3 are revisited and analysed quantitatively. If my 
typology of the blood collection regimes was successful, these regimes should be 
distinguishable from each other. Also, these institutions (blood collection regimes) 
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should influence the gift relationship which I examine quantitatively. In addition, 
the blood collection regimes should have distinguished effect in the donation rate 
than many other phenomena used to explain blood donation, such as religiosity, 
humane development, and social trust. 
Third research question considers the donor population of EU. Even though blood 
donor population has been studied before, studies considering entire EU using 
large datasets are few and far between (cf. Healy 2000; Wittock et al. 2017). My 
aim is to bring novel perspectives and deeper understanding into who donate 
blood by using quantitative methods. The research questions are revisited in the 
discussion. 
4.2 Overview of Methods 
To study blood donation across the EU two main methods are used. Multilevel 
logistic regression is used to uncover relationships of blood donation across and 
between individuals and the countries they inhabit. In addition, exploratory factor 
analysis is used to reduce dimensionality of variables. The variables constructed 
from the factor analysis are used both in multilevel logistic regression model and 
regular logistic regression model. Main methods and what they were used for are 
presented in Figure 3. In addition to those shown in Figure 3, correlation graphs 
are used to graphically examine country level correlations. In addition, in chapter 
2 a brief qualitative literature analysis was used. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of main quantitative methods used in the study 
In the multilevel analysis I use Stata statistical software 15 (StataCorp 2017). For 
visualisation, data manipulation, joining tables, and other related methods I used 
the open source R-statistical language (R Core Team 2018) with various packages, 
such as the eurostat package to access Eurostat data directly from R through an 
API (Lahti et al. 2017),7 and a collection of packages in the tidyverse ecosystem 
(Wickham 2017).  
4.3 Hypotheses 
To examine these research questions, I have deduced several hypotheses that I 
will test in the results section of this thesis. These hypotheses are constructed 
from previous studies. Some of them have been found to have an effect universally, 
while others in some countries. Hypotheses 1-7 are individual level hypotheses, 
while 8-13 are country level hypotheses. Hypotheses in Table 2 are divided into 
level 1 (individual level) and level 2 (country level) hypotheses, which are further 
discussed and argued in the following pages. 
 
7 Application Programming Interface 
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Table 2. Hypotheses divided in individual and country level 
 
H1: men are more likely to have donated than women. According to Bani and 
Giussani based on their review, in most European countries yearly donors consists 
of mostly men, with the exception of France, Netherlands and Denmark, where 
the share of gender is similar at 50%, and United Kingdom and Finland, where 
women take up larger share of the donations than men (2010, p.277).  
H2: age raises the likelihood of donation. Even though the fact that in many 
countries students donate a large share of yearly donations, the opportunity win-
dow for a single donation widens with every year lived (until 65, which is the 
upper-age limit).  
H3: those with children are more likely to be donors than those who do not have 
children. According to Wittock et al. (2017), the typical donor is (among other 
things) married with children. However, they did not directly test the likelihood 
of those who have children and instead used marital status. It would make sense 
that parents of children would donate blood, as the imagined recipient could very 
well be their children. Therefore, in this study I will test the effect of having 
children on the likelihood of being a donor. 
H4: people with higher education are more likely to be donors than those with 
lower education. This has been reported in multiple studies (cf. Wittock et al. 
2017; Healy 2000) and should be visible with the data in this question as well. 
For many, donating blood during college education is their first time donating. 
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H5: those who participate in blood donation are more susceptible of other donors, 
than those who are not blood donors. This is the first hypothesis that I directly 
associate with the gift relationship in blood donation. I argue, on the one hand, 
that because of the gift relationship’s binding nature those already participating 
in it are more susceptible to other donors not already participating in the rela-
tionship. And on the other hand, those who are not donors do not have such 
feelings of suspicion (as much at least) as those who are donors, as they regard 
blood transfusion more as a medical procedure than a reciprocal gift relationship. 
H6: donors are more likely than non-donors to accept compensation for donation. 
This is the second hypothesis regarding the gift relationship in blood donation. I 
argue, that due to the reciprocal nature of the gift relationship between donors 
and collection organisations, the donors are more likely to accept compensations 
for blood donation than those who are non-donors. The ones who have donated 
blood are introduced by the organisations into the reciprocity in the system, which 
vary from refreshments to non-cash items and even cash. Non-donors, however, 
are not included in the gift relationship and  
H7: people who personally know someone who has received blood are more likely 
to be donors. This network effect has been researched in multiple studies (cf. 
Healy 2000; Sojka and Sojka 2008, p.59). If a person knows someone who has 
received blood, they are more likely to donate themselves, as they feel the respon-
sibility to help, in this case, their relative or a friend. 
H8: the human development of a nation has positive effect on blood donation. 
This has been studied by de Kort et al. (2010). They showed that HDI does have 
connection with the number of blood units collected, especially the Educational 
Index part of the three component HDI. However, it should be interesting to see 
what are the relationship between HDI and the share of donors in a country, as  
is a different measure than used previously. 
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H9: blood donation is positively connected to other types of giving behaviour on 
the country level. The connection between other types of volunteering and gift 
giving have been studied by many researchers, especially using psychological ex-
planations (cf. Houston 2005; Lee et al. 1999; White et al. 2017). However, if 
blood donation is related to these other types of behaviours, then it should also 
be evident at the country level. 
H10: religiosity is positively connected to blood donation. The connection between 
religiosity and blood donation has been showed to be positive (cf. Pessi 2011; 
Heineck 2017; Beyerlein 2016). If this is true, then it should be visible on the 
country level as well. It should be noted that Healy discovered that there was no 
significant relation between religiosity and blood donation except in Red Cross 
regime countries. 
H11: social trust is connected positively to blood donation on country level. The 
trust that people have in blood collection organisations increases the likelihood to 
donate (Andaleeb and Basu 1995, p.44). However, I am interested in whether 
general social trust is connected to country level donation rate. As blood is do-
nated to an unknown recipient, I argue that general social trust affects the dona-
tion rate across countries.  
H12: in countries where army conscription is compulsory, the rate of blood do-
nation is higher. In the case of Austria and Finland, as explained in chapter 3, I 
found that conscripts of the armed forces have been used as a source of blood 
quite systematically. My argument is that because such large share of the popu-
lation is presented with incentivized opportunity to donate it should reflect in 
higher donation rate so that in those countries the donor share is larger. 
H13: blood collecting regimes have an effect in the rate of donors, in that state 
regime collects most effectively, Red Cross regime comes second, and the blood 
banks regime is third. This hypothesis is from Healy’s study (2000), in which he 
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found this effect. The interesting part regarding my study is whether this is still 
apparent, with the expansion of the EU. 
4.4 Data  
Main data for this study is the Eurobarometer 82.2 survey that was collected in 
2014 in which citizens over 15 years of age in all 28 European Union Member 
States were questioned about matters concerning e.g. transport, cyber security, 
taxation, public health, and blood donation (EC 2018). Sampling procedure con-
sisted of a multi-stage random probability sampling design. In most countries the 
aimed sample size was 1000 respondents per country, except the United Kingdom 
that had separate samples for Great Britain (1000) and Northern Ireland (300), 
and Germany, which had separate samples for Eastern Germany (500) and West-
ern Germany (1000). Furthermore, some smaller countries (Luxembourg, Cyprus 
& Malta) had 500 interviews each. Total number of respondents was 27868. Be-
cause Eastern and Western Germany do not significantly differ regarding blood 
donation, I have combined them together as well as Northern Ireland and the 
Great Britain (which together make United Kingdom). I also limited anyone not 
aged between 18 and 65 out from analysis because those are the most common 
limits to age regarding blood donation (WHO 2012, pp.39–40). Table 1, presented 
earlier in the study, shows the remaining respondents and the percentage of them 
that have ever given blood (weighted by population weight) after these changes. 
4.3  Variables 
4.3.1 Individual level variables 
The response variable in all the analyses is if the respondent has ever donated 
blood. In the Eurobarometer, the respondents were asked the following: During 
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the lifetime of a person it is possible to donate different body substances (blood 
or cells) to help other people. Could you please indicate which ones you have or 
would be prepared to donate yourself? This was followed by several different hu-
man-based products, one of which was blood. This question had four-level cate-
gorical answer which was coded into 1 or 0, whether the respondent has ever given 
blood8. The recategorized variable signifies if the respondent has ever donated 
blood. This means that in the analyses using this as response variable the com-
parison is made between those who have donated and those who have not, or 
donors and non-donors. 
For the multilevel model I use seven individual level independent variables. The 
summary statistics of the individual level variables (and the response variable) 
are presented in tables 3 and 49. The first individual level variable is gender. It is 
coded 0 for men, and 1 for female. This means that in the analysis men are the 
reference class to which women are compared to. Second variable is age. Only 
respondents between ages 18 and 65 are included because that is the most usual 
age limit to blood donation (WHO 2012, pp.39–40). Third is if there are children 
in the household aged less than 15. To code this I used two variables from the 
Eurobarometer: if there are children between 10 to 14, and if there are children 
under 10 years of age. If either of these were 1, I coded the new variable 1, else it 
was coded 0. Fourth variable is education. In the Eurobarometer, the only meas-
ure for education is the age that the respondent stopped full-time education. This 
is somewhat problematic measure as this at least in some cases measures the 
differences between countries’ educational system. However, the education index 
used as a country level variable should somewhat take this into account in the 
 
8 The original four categories are: “Yes, have donated in the past and would be prepared in the future”; 
“Yes, have donated in the past but would not be prepared to donate in the future”; “No, have not donated 
in the past but would be prepared to in the future”; and “No, have not donated in the past and would not 
be prepared to in the future.” The first two were coded into 1, and the last two into 0.  
9 Age that the respondent stopped full time education is shown in this table as continuous, even 
as it is categorised in the actual analysis. 
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multilevel model. Next two variables are compensation and mistrust variables, 
which are explained in chapter 4.4.1. The final individual level variable is the 
network effect. This is whether the respondent personally knows someone who 
has ever been given blood.  
Table 3. Summary statistics of individual level variables 
 
Table 4. Row percentages of educational scale 
 
4.3.2 Country level variables 
Summary statistics of the country level variables are presented in Table 5. Human 
Development Index is a ranking that aims at measuring human development. It 
comprises of three different measurements: Life expectancy index, Education in-
dex, and GNI index10. (UN 2018.) Much like De Kort et al. (2010), I use the three 
different factors independently to study their relation to blood donation. The data 
 
10 GNI index used by UN is calculated with purchasing power parity and is often referred as PPP. 
However, in this thesis I simply refer to it as GNI index. 
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was acquired from Human Development Report 2014 (Malik 2014) and was ap-
pended to the main data. 
Table 5. Summary statistics of country level variables 
 
Religiousness is measured with a question how important in your life: religion, 
from another survey. Only data that had surveyed results of importance of religion 
in all the countries in EU that I could find was European Values Study (EVS) 
fourth wave collected in 2008 (EVS 2011). Over 70,000 citizens in Europe were 
interviewed. The data has been criticised for quality differences between some 
countries because of the uneven methods used (McAndrew and Voas 2011, 11). 
Furthermore, there is a six-year gap between the Eurobarometer data that I use 
and the EVS data. To test if the 2008 data is comparable to more accurate ones, 
such as European Social Survey (ESS 2014), I tested it in two ways: first, I tested 
how the ‘importance of religion’ variable in EVS is correlates with the 0-10 scaled 
‘How religious are you?’. To test this, I recoded the four categorised religion var-
iable in EVS to two categories, after which I calculated country averages using 
population weights. With the ESS round 4 (ESS 2008), I calculated weighted 
means for the 0-10 scaled variable after which I tested the correlation between 
them. As stated previously, there were some missing countries between these da-
tasets as all EU countries do not participate in the ESS. This left me with 18 
countries of the whole 28. The correlations are shown in Table 6, which indicates 
quite linear relation. Second, I tested if there has been major change between 2008 
and 2014. For this I similarly compared the EVS 2008 religion variable to ESS 
round 7 (ESS 2014) religion. With the 2014 data only 16 of the 28 countries were 
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available. Between these, the correlation coefficient is 0.846, which indicates that 
some accuracy has been lost during the six-year gap, be it for the missing countries 
or the change that has happened between these years. However, I find that re-
garding this study, the EVS data is the best possible available to investigate the 
relationship between the relatively slow changing blood donation and religiosity. 
As the only even remotely accurate data consisting of all countries in my analysis, 
I decided to include EVS 2008 religiosity. The country level means were appended 
with the Eurobarometer data. 
The next country level variable is trust. Similarly, as with religiousness, I used 
EVS 2008 as the source for the trust variable. The variable is binary in the data, 
and was recoded as 1 for “Most people can be trusted”, and 0 for “Cannot be too 
careful”, similar to what Köneke did in her study (2014), and for all countries the 
mean was calculated using the EVS population weight after which the means were 
appended to the Eurobarometer data. The correlations between EVS and ESS 
trust are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Pearson correlation coefficients between EVS and ESS 
 
World Giving Index is an index calculated by Charities Aid Foundation to meas-
ure giving behaviour by three measurements: giving money, giving time (working 
for charities), and helping strangers. The measure is calculated by averaging and 
each country is given a percentage and ranked according to it (CAF 2011.) Instead 
of the index, which ranks countries, I use the percentage of people that engage in 
giving behaviour that is used for the ranking process. This country level percent-
age was appended to the Eurobarometer data. 
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Since Blood donation is historically in many countries connected to the armed 
forces, it would seem logical that countries with ongoing conscription have higher 
donation rates. At least in the case of Austria and Finland I found evidence of 
close relations between blood services and armed forces. In Austria, donors in the 
armed forces get to leave for holidays earlier (Costa-Font, Jofre-Bonet, and Yen 
2013, p.548), and in Finland conscripts, at least in past, had the choice between 
blood donation and a loaded march (Leikola 2004, p.272). If the country has 
ongoing conscription, it is easy to imagine that the large share of population in 
service are an easy target for the blood services to aim at. Conscripts are conven-
iently packed in barracks where the recruitment is easy to do, especially with 
incentives like in the aforementioned cases. I did not locate any studies that take 
this into consideration. Countries in the data that had ongoing conscription as of 
2010 were Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Lith-
uania, and Sweden (CIA 2019). I then tested the relationship between blood donor 
rate and conscription using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. Correlation 
coefficient (ρ =0.55; p=0.002) indicates that conscription does have connection to 
blood donation rate. This makes sense, since binominal “has ever given blood” 
requires a single donation time. For many conscripts the time of their service 
marks the first (and possibly only) time they have given blood (Leikola 2004, 
p.272). Regime, explained in Chapter 3, is the final country level variable. 
4.4 Methods 
This study has two main methods: multilevel logistic regression and logistic re-
gression. Additionally, the countries country level variables are examined with 
simple correlations. Two depended variables used in the logistic regression models 
are constructed with exploratory factor analysis. In this part, I explain the meth-
ods and how they were used. The results of the models are presented later in the 
fifth chapter. 
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4.4.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
The exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce the dimensionality of two 
types of questions. I began exploratory factor analysis by choosing the variables 
for it. I chose all variables concerning two types of questions in the data. First 
was question about ‘For donating blood or plasma during someone’s lifetime, do 
you consider it acceptable…?’ from which I chose variables qe5a_1 to qe5a_8.11 
Second question type was ‘Which of the following concerns would you have if you 
were treated with donated blood, cells or tissues?’. From these I chose qe8_1 to 
qe8_8. For more detailed explanation of these variables see questionnaire in the 
Appendix. All these variables were binominal variables: either the respondent 
considered the questioned thing acceptable or they had concerns (1 = mentioned, 
0 = not mentioned). Because the variables are dichotomous, tetrachoric correla-
tion coefficients are used to explore the relationships between these variables 
(cf. Bock, Gibbons, and Muraki 1988). I then used as criterion that the loadlugs 
should be higher than 0.3 and removed all variables that did not meet the crite-
rion. After that I ran tetrachoric correlations again and ran the promax rotated 
factor loadings to consider eigenvalues (Hendrickson and White 1964). Thereafter, 
I decided by using the Kaiser-criterion that there should be two factors as only 
two of them had eigenvalues above 1 (Cliff 1988). 
From the variables that loaded into these factors, I created sum variables stand-
ardised between 0 and 1. First factor was named as ‘compensation’. It consists of 
8 different variables that concern different types of compensation considered ac-
ceptable for blood or plasma donor.12 The second factor consisted of three factors 
 
11 The variables are presented in more detail in the appendix.  
12 The variables in the acceptable compensation group of questions are: travel cost, time off work, 
refreshments, non-cash item, free physical check, free testing, free medical treatment, and cash 
compensation. 
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concerning concerns regarding receiving blood or other tissues13. I named this 
factor “mistrust”, since all these variables concern lack of trust in the possible 
donor.14  
To summarise, the compensation variable denotes how much the respondent be-
lieves different types of compensations to be acceptable in blood donation. I argue 
that this is different between donors and non-donors. Donors are already embed-
ded into the gift relationship and have experienced the reciprocal nature of it. 
Blood collecting organisations often give small tokens of appreciation to donors 
and refreshments are routinely given after donation. Donors feel these are natural 
part of the relationship because they are already part of the exchange. Non-do-
nors, however, who are not part of the relationship are not familiar with the 
exchanges in the relationship and should be less inclined to accept these same 
compensations. 
The mistrust variable, I argue, tells of how the respondent considers those who 
are not part of the gift relationship. The concrete way in which donated blood 
circulates in the recipients own body may be connected to feelings of what kind 
of person the blood comes from. The phrasing of the questions in the variable 
alludes that the person giving blood is from an outside group. Those, who are 
part of the gift relationship, should feel differently about these questions than 
non-donors who consider the relationship more in the sense of a medical proce-
dure. As such, I predict that those who are donors feel more concern than non-
donors. 
 
13 These variables were: concern that the donor is from other EU country, concern that the donor 
is paid, and concern that the donor is from outside of EU. 
14 Factor loadings and screeplot are presented in the appendix. 
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4.4.2 Country level correlations 
Before moving onto more advanced methods, I examine and visualise the rela-
tionships between country level variables. To make sense into the relationships 
between the country level variables even before moving into the multilevel model, 
I make sure that all the relationships between these variables are accounted for. 
The reason I choose to visualise these correlations is based on the argument that 
Healy and Moody (2014) made that sociology lags behind other sciences in statis-
tical visualisation. Especially with correlations, simple numeric values may hide 
the fact that the variables are correlated when in fact they are not, or vice versa15.   
The correlations are calculated in Pearson’s correlation coefficients (PCC), which 
is the measure of the strength of linear association between variables. I check the 
correlation between countries with all countries, and then with each regime sepa-
rately. In addition, I calculate the p-values for these correlations. A linear line is 
drawn to visualise the linear association. The visualisation is presented in Figure 
5.  
4.4.3.  Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression model is a generalization of the linear regression model, in 
which the outcome variable is not linear but binomial. The idea is to predict the 
likelihood that one or the other of the possible outcomes (1 or 0) occurs. (Num-
menmaa 2004, pp.319-321.) The equation of logistic regression can be written as 
such: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 
 
15 For more, see the four correlation graphs later widely known as Anscombe’s quartet, in 
Anscombe 1973. 
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The 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) is the conditional probability of the outcome 1 divided by the 
outcome 0. 𝐵0 is the intercept, and 𝐵1 is the slope of 𝑋𝑖, which is the independent 
variable. Compared to the multilevel logistic regression introduced next this has 
only one level. 
It should be noted that the log odds are transformed into average marginal effects 
(AME) to compare the effects across models because odds ratios (OR) or log-
odds-ratios used in logistic regression do not take account the unobserved heter-
ogeneity that may vary across models or groups (Mood 2010, p.80). In addition, 
AMEs have the advantage of allowing an intuitive interpretation, for they are an 
average effect on the probability of the response variable. AMEs quantify the 
absolute differences between the probabilities across groups. This means that it 
can be used to compare the probability across groups. The equation for AME is 
presented below (as explained in Mood 2010, p.75). 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝛽𝑥1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖) 
𝛽𝑥1 is the estimated log odds ratio for the variable 𝑥1, and 𝛽𝑥𝑖 is the value of the 
logit for the 𝑖-th observation. The 𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖) is the logistic probability distribution 
function. The AME makes it possible to compare the effects across models and 
interpret the effects in percentages, so it was chosen for this study. 
4.4.4 Multilevel model 
Multilevel models are used to take into account processes that have an influence 
on the variable of interest at multiple levels by modeling the effects at each level. 
This means that instead of single coefficient (slope), multiple coefficients will be 
used. Even if the equations for all levels are computed simultaneously, it is con-
ceptually easier to break them as series of equations in which coefficients from 
52 
another level are passed to the other level of analysis (Nezlek 2011, p.9). This 
means that instead of analysis on one level we can use aggregated data on other 
levels. Non-multilevel models depend heavily on assumption of independency of 
the observations. When this is not the case – as is usual with hierarchical data – 
it might lead to significant results that actually are caused by the un-accounted 
hierarchy in the data. (Nezlek 2011, pp.4-5.) Multilevel models take into account 
the dependencies of the observations withing groups. 
Multilevel in data means that the observations are collected in at multiple levels, 
thus comprising a hierarchical data. The observations must be nested together in 
at least two levels to make the data multilevel. (Nezlek 2011, pp.8-9.) In the case 
of this thesis, the most evident levels are individual (respondent) level and country 
level (see Figure 4). Other levels could be for example regime, city, state, and so 
on. For this analysis, I use two levels: individual level and country level, since e.g. 
regime does not have sufficient number of groups.  
The number of observations after removing respondents with missing variables in 
the data at the individual level is 20,407. At the country level there are 28 groups, 
one for each country. The number of observations in each country is shown in 
Table 1. None of the continuous variables are centered, and the reference catego-
ries of the categorical variables are presented clearly in the model tables.  
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the hierarchy in the data 
Because the response variable (has ever donated blood) is in this case binominal, 
I use multilevel logistical regression. The model is mixed effects logistic regression, 
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to be specific. It is used to model binomial response variables in which the out-
comes are modeled as linear combinations of the independent variables (cf. Som-
met and Morselli 2017).  
First, the intraclass correlation coefficient must be calculated. To calculate it, it 
is necessary to first calculate the log-odds between clusters or, to be more precise, 
between countries. In the empty model I estimate the log-odds of ever giving 
blood without any predicting variables. This empty multilevel logistic regression 
equation is presented below. 
Logit(odds) = 𝐵00 + 𝑢𝑜𝑗 
In this equation, Logit(odds) represent the log-odds that the response variable is 
1 instead of 0. It is allowed to differ between countries, or in other words the 
slopes are allowed to vary. 𝐵00 is the fixed intercept and 𝑢𝑜𝑗 is the country level 
residual. Now the intraclass correlation (ICC) can be calculated. The equation for 
the ICC is presented below. 
ICC =
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑜𝑗)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑜𝑗) + (𝜋2/3)
 
The 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑜𝑗) represents the random slope variance, which in this case is the 
country level variance. On the lower side of the equation, the (𝜋2/3) is the stand-
ard logistic distribution, which equals ≈ 3.29. 
Intraclass correlation (ICC) serves as the degree of similarity of the outcome (is 
a donor) between countries. It is the proportion of between-country variation 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑜𝑗). In this case, it is the between-country variation of the probability of 
being a donor. It ranges from zero to one, in which zero is perfect independency 
of the residuals in which case the country does not affect the probability of being 
a donor. Furthermore, if ICC is 1, there is perfect interdependency of the residu-
als, which would mean that the observations only vary between countries. In this 
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case, it would mean that either no-one or everyone has donated in a country, and 
there is no within country variation. 
In the case of this study, the empty model ICC is calculated thus: 
0.0890784
0.0890784+3.29
=
0.0263628.16 This means that only ≈ 2.6% of the propability of being donor is 
explained by differences within-country. Thus, according to the empty model, 
values within-countries are not similar. According to Nezlek, contrary to some 
recommendations, this does not mean that multilevel model is inappropriate. ICC 
tells very little about how relationships between variables vary between groups, 
and because this data is undoubtedly hierarchical, Nezlek recommends multilevel 
model. (Nezlek 2011, p.32) 
I now add variables to the model. In model 1, I add all individual level variables 
and the three country level variables that amount to HDI. For the sake of sim-
plicity, in the equation below I have only added one independent variable for each 
level. Let us say that these variables are “Female” for individual level, and “GNI” 
for the country level. This simplified model is shown in equation below. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) = 𝐵00 + 𝐵10 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝐵01 ∗ 𝑿𝑗 + 𝑢𝑜𝑗 
In this equation, 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) is the log odds of being a donor. 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) is 
actually 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1)/(1– 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1)), which is the logit of the (conditional) 
probability that the outcome variable, in this case being a donor, equals 1, which 
is divided by the probability that it equals 0, that is not being a donor. 𝐵00 
represents the fixed intercept. 
The 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the individual level variable, which is if the respondent is female. 𝐵10 
is the fixed slope of 𝑥𝑖𝑗. The 𝐗𝑗 is the country-level variable, in this case the GNI. 
𝐵01 is the fixed slope of country level variable 𝐗𝑗. In the actual model (presented 
 
16 Empty model is not further reported in this study. 
5 5  
l at er) all i n di vi d u al l e v el v ari a bl es ar e p r es e nt f r o m t h e fir st m o d el, a n d a d diti o n-
all y s o ar e t h e t h r e e v ari a bl e s t h at c o ns ti t u t e t h e H u m a n D e v el o p m e n t I n d e x. 
T h e d e vi a n c e of t h e m o d e l 1 e q u al s 2 2 9 4 4. 9 8 5. Af t er t h e fir s t m o d el, m or e c o u ntr y 
l e v el v ari a bl es ar e a d d e d st e p b y s t e p. 
N e xt , I s h o w t h e m o d el 1 e q u ati o n i n f ull , a d a p ti n g t h e e q u ati o n s h o w n i n H o x et 
al. ( 2 0 1 7, p p. 1 1 1 -1 1 2), u si n g t h e v ari a bl e n a m es t o si m plif y t h e i nt er p r et ati o n.  
T hi s e q u ati o n diff er s s o m e w h at f r o m t h e o n e s  s h o w n p r e vi o usl y, as it d o es n ot 
s h o w e v er y sl o p e s e p ar at el y. H o w e v er, t hi s s h o ul d m a k e it cl e ar w h at t h e m o d el 
c o nsis ts of.  
𝜋 𝑖 𝑗 = l o gi sti c( 𝐵 0 0 + 𝐵 1 0 ∗ 𝐹 𝑒 𝑚 𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝐴 𝑔 𝑒 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝐶 ℎ 𝑖𝑙 𝑑 𝑟 𝑒 𝑛 𝐻𝐻 𝑖 𝑗 +  
𝐸 𝑑 𝑢 𝑐 𝑎 𝑡𝑖 𝑜 𝑛 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝑀𝑖 𝑠 𝑡 𝑟 𝑢 𝑠 𝑡 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝐶 𝑜 𝑚 𝑝 𝑒 𝑛 𝑠 𝑎 𝑡𝑖 𝑜 𝑛 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝑁 𝑒 𝑡 𝑤 𝑜 𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 𝑗 +  
𝐺 𝑁 𝐼𝑗 + 𝐸 𝑑 𝑢𝐼 𝑛 𝑑 𝑒 𝑥 𝑗 + 𝐿𝑖 𝑓 𝑒 𝐸 𝑥 𝑝𝐼 𝑛 𝑑 𝑒 𝑥 𝑗 + 𝑢 𝑜 𝑗  )  
T h e v ari a bl e s f oll o w e d b y 𝑖 𝑗  ar e i n di vi d u al l e v el v ari a bl e s, a n d t h e v ari a bl e s f ol-
l o w e d b y 𝑗  ar e c o u n tr y l e v el v ari a bl e s. I n t h e a d diti o n al m o d els, m or e c o u ntr y 
l e v el v ari a bl e s ar e si m pl y a d d e d t o t his e q u ati o n a n d c o m p ar e d t o t h e ot h er m o d-
el s.  It s h o ul d b e n ot e d t h at t h e r es ult s of t h e m ultil e v el m o d el ar e tr a n sf or m e d 
i n t o A M Es f or m or e i nt uiti v e i n t er p r et ati o n. 
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5 RESULTS 
In this chapter results are presented. The country level correlations graphed are 
first, followed by the multilevel model, in which the whole European Union’s 
donor population is examined. After that blood collection regimes are compared 
side by side with logistic regression. 
5.1 Country Level Correlations 
The country level correlations are mainly used to illuminate the relationship be-
tween blood donation and country level variables. But I will briefly discuss the 
results of the examination where it is relevant regarding the hypotheses. Figure 5 
shows the relationships between country level variables. 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplots of country level variables against blood donation rate 
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In each of the four subgraphs, the PCC values (represented by R) and p-values 
are embedded into the graphs. The arrangement corresponds to the one in the 
legend of the graph on the right side of the figure in that the top one is the 
correlation with all the countries combined and after which are the values for each 
of the regimes. It should be noted that the statistical significance is closely related 
with the sample size. In this case, the sample consists of only 28 countries, and 
with the regimes singled out even lower. Nevertheless, I include the statistics here 
if only to show that they were accounted for. 
In the case of religiosity, there are no statistically significant correlations. The 
Red Cross regime comes the closest, but that is affected by Austria which seems 
like an outlier. This seems to conflict with hypothesis 10, which was that religi-
osity is connected to blood donation rates, at least at the country level. However, 
as according to Healy’s results (2000, pp.1649-1650), religiosity is related to blood 
donation at the individual level at Red Cross regime countries. So there seems to 
be some connection, but it is not statistically significant.  
The next subgraph shows the relationship between share of donors and other 
types of giving behaviour. Again, there is no significant correlation, but as before, 
the Red Cross regime stands out, even as it is not statistically significant. Also, 
in the state regime, the correlation is strongly negative, but again is not statisti-
cally significant. These findings would indicate that the hypothesis 9 (that blood 
donation is related to other types of giving behaviour) does not get support at 
least at the country level. 
In the lower left subgraph, the relationship between trust and blood donor per-
centage is shown. There are no statistically significant correlations, but the state 
regime comes closest in that with trust, the donor rate increases (p=0.066). This 
does seem to indicate, that in state regime countries, where the collection of blood 
is more related to public health services, the general trust in other people does 
raise the donor share. However, as the test result is not significant, this kind of 
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interpretation is not valid. Last is the subgraph in the lower right. It shows the 
relationship between HDI and blood donation share of a country. Again, there are 
no statistically significant correlations. HDI seems not to have connection with 
donor share, at least when not fractioned into its sub-pieces.  
The results in Figure 5 cannot be used to either dismiss or support the theses. 
Correlations are too simple method to examine this data that is constructed hier-
archically. However, the graphs do give insight into the relationships between 
regimes. 
5.2      Multilevel Model 
In the Table 7 the multilevel logistic regression is presented. The response variable 
is whether the respondent has ever donated blood. Models are constructed in 
stepwise method, in which more variables are added in each model. I report the 
models from left to right (from 1 to 6), starting with individual level variables 
and moving from top to bottom. In cases where the individual level variable does 
not change from model to model, I state it in the first model and do not repeat it 
unnecessarily afterwards17. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 It should be noted that the models were tested in different arrangements and by removing those 
that did not have effect (not reported here). However, these approaches did not change the results 
in a meaningful way, so no variables are removed after introducing them. 
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Table 7. Multilevel logistic regression of blood donation with AMEs 
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Model 1 has all the individual level variables gender: age, presence of children in 
household, age that the respondent quit full-time education with 20 and more as 
reference category, the two variables that were constructed with factor analysis, 
named mistrust and compensation, and lastly network effect. In addition, model 
1 includes the three variables that together make Human Development Index: 
gross national income index, education index, and life expectancy index. The in-
traclass correlation (ICC) of model 1 is 2.61%, which is very slightly lower than 
the empty model ICC. In the model 1, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is 
24533. When moving to other models, this should lower, implicating a better 
model. 
According to model 1, females are 11 percentage points less likely to be blood 
donors than men (p<0.001). This supports hypothesis 1. It should be noted that 
the data used does not concern the composition of the yearly donations, but of 
people who have ever donated.  
Age increases the probability of being a blood donor by 0.4 percentage points per 
year of age (p<0.001), which supports hypothesis 2. This makes sense, since the 
possibility window for ever donating blood raises with each year lived. It would 
be, however, incorrect to say that older people donate blood more, because this 
dependent variable is 1 when there is a single occurrence of donation. The age 
ranges from 18 to 65, so no outliers are present to skew the results. The effect of 
age does not significantly vary between models, and because of that it is not 
discussed further in this chapter. 
Having children in the household increases the likelihood of being a donor by 3.3 
percentage points (p<0.001). The effect is relatively low but is statistically signif-
icant. As the marital status is not considered in this model, it is hard to say 
compared to previous findings if this truly means that that people with children 
are more likely to be donors, as stated in hypothesis 3. This effect does not change 
when moving from model to another, so it will not be further discussed here.  
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The effect of education on blood donation is as expected. The reference category, 
those who stopped full time education at 20 or older, are more likely to be donors 
than the three other categories, with the gap in likelihood increasing each step. 
Those who sopped education at up to 15 are less likely to be donors than reference 
category (p<0.001), and so are those who stopped at 16-19 years (p<0.001). This 
supports the hypothesis 4, which was backed by previous studies as well. Inter-
estingly, those who are still studying are only slightly less likely to be donors than 
reference category (p<0.05), and they are closest to highly educated. This might 
indicate that during the time spent studying many become donors. However, a 
more thorough examination would be required to further explain this. In any of 
the categories, the effect does not change from model to another, so it will not be 
discussed here anymore. 
The mistrust variable (consisting of the variables explained in the factor analysis) 
does have a positive effect on blood donation (p<0.001).The hypothesis 5, that 
those who participate in the gift relationship are more likely to feel lack of trust 
regarding those who they regard outside of the relationship, gets some support. 
These effects do not significantly vary from model to model, so for now, they are 
not discussed further.  
Compensation does have a positive relation to likelihood of being a donor 
(p<0.001), which supports the hypothesis 6. As explained in the part dealing with 
exploratory factor analysis, the variable consists of different types of acceptance 
of compensation related questions. The effect of compensation does not vary from 
model to model, so it is not discussed further here. 
Perhaps not surprising, the network effect of knowing a recipient of blood raises 
the likelihood of being a, donor by 16 percentage point compared to those who do 
not know recipient of blood (p<0.001) according to model 1. Hypothesis 7 is sup-
ported by this result. As with the previous individual level variables, the network 
effect does not change from model to model, so it is not discussed here further. 
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Of the country level variables, the components of the HDI are present in the 
model 1. There are no statistically significant correlations between the compo-
nents and blood donor rate. This is somewhat surprising, and conflicts with hy-
pothesis 8. It should be noted, that de Kort et al. (2017) study which examined 
HDI had more countries outside of EU as well, so there is more variation in the 
components of the HDI. But still, it is surprising that none of the components of 
HDI are related to the donor rate of the countries. This does indicate, that blood 
donation does not follow the regular measurements of a society’s development.  
The effects of the components of HDI do not vary from model to model (at least 
in statistically significant way), so in this chapter they are not discussed further. 
In Model 2, another country level variable is added, the World Giving Index (or 
to be more precise, the percentage that is used in the ranking process by CAF). 
The AIC in Model 2 is slightly higher than in Model 1, which indicates a worse 
model, but I chose to keep this as the variable is theoretically sound and relevant. 
The ICC is slightly lower, which indicates that less variation is left unexplained 
in the country level. However, the effect WGI has on blood donation is not sta-
tistically significant. This conflicts with hypothesis 9. The rate of other types of 
gift giving behaviour seem not be related to blood donation on the country level. 
The effect of WGI does not significantly change from model to model, so it is not 
discussed here further. 
In Model 3, the effect of country level religiosity is added. The model AIC is again 
slightly higher than in the previous model, indicating a worse model. Again, how-
ever, I decided to keep this variable as its connection with blood donation has 
been discussed in the previous literature. ICC is identical to that in Model 2.  The 
hypothesis 10 does not get support, as there is no statistically significant effect 
between religiosity and blood donation on the country level. Again, Healy (2000) 
discovered this as well, by using as a variable church attendance. The correlations 
later presented in Figure 5 also indicate the same result, even when countries are 
divided into regimes.  
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Model 4 adds another country level variable, trust, into the analysis. AIC lowers 
from previous model, which indicates a better model. The ICC also is lower from 
the previous model. The effect of trust is statistically significant and positive 
(p<0.05). It means that in countries where general trust is higher, the likelihood 
of donation rises. The hypothesis 11 does get support from this result. General 
trust in other people may raise the donation rate because the imagined stranger 
that receives the blood seems more trustworthy and worthy of the blood. It may 
also mean that the general trust also applies to the organisations that collect 
blood, and because of this the likelihood of donation increases. However, this 
should be examined more carefully.  
In Model 5, whether country has armed forces that conscripts from the general 
population is added. AIC lowers quite a bit from the previous models, and so does 
ICC. This indicates a good addition to the model. The effect of conscription is 
positive in that in those countries that have conscription, the likelihood of dona-
tion is 8.2 percentage points higher (p<0.001). Thus, hypothesis 12 does get sup-
ported. It does seem, that armed forces give the blood collection organisations a 
convenient way to collect blood. This might not be surprising but is a novel ad-
dition in the comparison of the institutionalized basis of blood donation across 
countries.  
Furthermore, the addition of conscription positively changes the effect that trust 
has. Because trust is scaled between 0 and 1, if scaled to more used scale of 1-10, 
this would mean that in Model 5 the likelihood of individual in a country being a 
donor is increased by roughly 3.2 percentage points when country level trust is 
increased by 1, compared that of Model 4 in which the effect was roughly 2.3 
percentage points.  
In the final model, Model 6, the blood collection regime is added, with the state 
regime as the reference category. The AIC is lowest of all the models and so is 
ICC, which means that this model is the best fit of the models. The regimes do 
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have connection to blood donation: in blood banks regime the share of donors is 
9% lower than in state regime (p<0.01), and in Red Cross it is 3.7% lower, but 
not in a statistically significant way. Thus, the hypothesis 13 does get supported 
by this finding, at least between state and blood banks. The effect of conscription 
raises in the model to 10%. (p<00.1). It seems there are some differences in how 
the conscription affects blood donation in the different regimes.  
5.3. Comparison of the Blood Collection Regimes 
The multilevel model illuminated interesting characteristics of the donor popula-
tion. However, some questions remain on the specific differences between the 
blood collection regimes. Table 8 presents the logistic regression of ever donating 
blood with countries pooled into the regimes and compared side by side.18  
 
18 Logistic regression was made for each country separately as well (presented in Appendix) 
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Table 8. Logistic regression of the different regimes using AMEs 
 
The likelihood of a donor being female shown in the multilevel model is clearly 
not universal. In the state regime, women are roughly as likely as men to be 
donors, while in Red Cross regime, women are 7.2 percentage points less likely to 
be donors than men (p<0.001). In the blood banks regime, the difference is clear: 
women are more than 13 percentage points less likely to be donors than men 
(p<0.001). Now the hypothesis 1 is again visited, and clearer picture is uncovered. 
Men are more likely to be donors than women, except in state regime. This is 
somewhat surprising, as women have multiple restrictions regarding blood dona-
tion that affect them more than men and are more often deferred from donations 
(Madrona et al. 2014, p.11). This might be explained by the fact that in the state 
regime, the blood collection is organised near the public hospital system. Because 
women make up most of the workers in hospitals (nurses etc.), the opportunities 
they have for donating are increased. The fact that in blood banks regime women 
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are the least likely to donate might be explained by the fact that in many blood 
bank regime countries there are volunteer donor organisations. Some of these or-
ganisations are linked to organisations such as boy scouts, which might explain 
the lower prevalence of female donors. Furthermore, according to Bani and 
Giussani (2010, p.278), women are more inclined to donate for altruistic reasons 
than men. These results might indicate that in state regime the donation oppor-
tunities are more linked with general altruism. However, the more probable ex-
planation is the fact that women simply are closer to blood collection in state 
regime than others. 
Age has, in all the regimes, a positive effect on blood donation. The biggest effect 
is found in state regime, where each year raises the likelihood of being donor by 
0.6%, compared to that of Red Cross and blood banks, at 0.4% each. Hypothesis 
2 is then confirmed, as this is universal in all the regimes as well as in the multi-
level model. 
Whether there are children in the household does have a statistically significant 
positive effect in state and Red Cross regimes. This is most clear in the Red Cross 
regime, in which the probability of those who have children against those who do 
not have children is 5.6 percentage points higher. In state regime the effect is also 
positive and statistically significant. In blood banks regime the effect is not sta-
tistically significant. This means that hypothesis 3 gets conditional support. 
The effect that education has is universal across the regimes. In state and blood 
banks regimes education does have a positive effect on blood donation, much like 
in the multilevel model. In the Red Cross regime, however, education has no 
statistically significant effect on blood donation. This finding is quite remarkable. 
It means that Red Cross seems to be able to collect blood from a wider population 
of people from different educational background. The effects are, in some cases, 
contrary than those in the other regimes. However, they are not statistically sig-
nificant, so no further analysis is possible with this model. 
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Regarding the mistrust variable, it is only statistically significant in the case of 
the state regime. That is, only in state regime those who feel mistrust are more 
likely to be donors. This result somewhat does not support hypothesis 5. It might 
be argued that the mistrust effect does not function the same way across the 
regimes. In state regime, it is possible that the donation of blood is more related 
to notions of a national blood supply, as explained in the part dealing with the 
French project of national blood. The mistrust might, in this light, be more related 
to the regime than the gift relationship. However, it might be said that the gift 
relationship in these regimes is different. But this is something that cannot be 
confirmed with this data. 
The effects of the compensation variable are interesting across the regimes. In 
state and Red Cross regimes the effect is statistically significant in that those who 
feel that compensation is acceptable are more likely to be donors. Hypothesis 6 
seems to only apply in some regimes. In Red Cross regime the effect is quite high 
compared to others, but because the AMEs are the absolute probabilities between 
groups (inside a regime in this model) the between regime effect sizes cannot be 
interpreted across models. One thing, however, is certain: the effect is not univer-
sal. 
The network effect, on the contrary, does have a universal effect across regimes. 
In all the regimes knowing someone who has received blood increases the likeli-
hood of being donor by over 10 percentage points compared to those who do not 
personally know a recipient of blood. Hypothesis 7 is confirmed. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
The simple correlation examination did show interesting patterns about the rela-
tionships between countries, and especially the regimes. This type of graphing 
should be used more often when dealing with any type of comparative research, 
as they allow for a more precise construction of hypotheses before moving on to 
more sophisticated methods. Even better, now that we have both the correlation 
graph and the multilevel model, it is possible to further reflect on the results.  
Even if women donate in some countries more often the fact that women are also 
more affected by biological limits regarding donation. These factors that make 
the donation opportunity window for women smaller are pregnancy, as pregnant 
women are not allowed to donate, and the usual body weight limit, that is 50 kg, 
affects women more often than men. Also, the haemoglobin screening affects 
women more than men as women have, for various reasons, usually lower haemo-
globin than men. (WHO 2012, pp.41, 43, 46.) This means that the likelihood of 
donor being a female should be significantly lower than that of men. The biological 
and social barriers are present at the whole EU level. It would be fruitful to study 
the specific countries in more detail to examine how the possibilities to donate 
differ in each country, and further, in each regime. Because the effect of gender 
does not notably change from model to model, I will not discuss it further when 
dealing with the other models.  
The variable constructed with exploratory factor analysis consists of variables 
consisted of concerns in the case the respondent were being treated with donated 
human matter. This result indicates that the gift relationship in blood donation 
for the donors also functions as a way of barring people from the relationship, and 
the lower probability of the non-donors indicates that those who are not donors 
do not share the same concerns as deeply. It is hard to say how much this result 
reflects the actual gift relationship, but it undoubtedly shows that regarding it 
there are differences between donors and non-donors.  
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This result is congruent with the one Healy (2000, p.1649) discovered. This does 
seem to point toward the argument that blood donation is more related to how it 
is collected than general giving behaviour. So even if in some studies the relation-
ship between blood donation and other types of giving behaviour has been shown 
at the individual level, at the country level something else should explain blood 
donation.  
The results of the multilevel model can be summed up as follows: the individual 
level variables tested had clear effect on the likelihood of being donor even with 
country level variables accounted for. The country level hypotheses of the effects 
of human development, other types of giving behaviour, and religion did not have 
effect when examined at the country level. It should be added, that logistic re-
gressions made without any other variables (not reported in this thesis) showed 
that all variables except trust and religiosity had, on their own, a positive (though 
small) effect on blood donation, so the multilevel model was required to show 
what the effects truly were. The effect of the country level trust only became 
significant in the multilevel model so even as some recommendations warn against 
using multilevel model when the ICC is low, these results indicates that multilevel 
models should still be considered.  
While the multilevel model showed the whole EU’s donor population the compar-
ison of the regimes side by side did illuminate the donor populations further and 
allowed for the discarding of hypotheses that seemed to be confirmed in the mul-
tilevel model, or at least the hypotheses universality was shown not to be correct. 
Many of the hypotheses constructed from the previous studies were confirmed. 
However, especially those that considered country level variables were more often 
discarded. This emphasizes that blood donation should be examined with more 
comparative design, and that the relationship between blood donation and human 
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development, giving behaviour, religiosity, and trust should be examined further. 
Conscription was introduced as a novel and significant effect on blood donation. 
However, as more countries are leaving conscription army behind, its effect will 
surely diminish. However, in these countries the close organizational ties between 
blood collectors and the armed forces are expected to affect the donor population 
in the future. 
5.5 Limitations 
Main limitations of this study regarding the typology of the countries into regimes 
is the fact that there is no reliable source that has the available information to 
divide these countries confidently into said regimes. All available information of 
how blood collection is structured in each country does not cover all countries. 
Furthermore, sources regarding some countries are not very recent. In fact, one 
could say that the sources I have been able to uncover are snippets and only 
expose a small portion of the whole picture. Even so, I believe that my arrange-
ment of these countries into regimes is somewhat accurate. I have tried to use 
best available data, ranging from peer-reviewed articles to publications authored 
by international organisations. Another approach would have been leaving out 
countries that were of mixed regime or hard to categorise otherwise, however, I 
decided to include all countries just like Healy did. I categorised the Netherlands 
to state regime since it had undergone major shift in blood collection organisation. 
However, it might very well be that it should have been categorised into Red 
Cross regime like Healy did, since it takes time for it to really show in the donor 
population. Another notable possible approach not covered in this study would 
have been adding another regime to the typology. With so many new countries 
(especially Eastern European countries) new regime might make sense. 
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6    DISCUSSION 
The first researc question was: Can blood donation be considered as a unique gift 
relationship? As was shown in Chapter 2, the gift relationship in blood donation 
does have effect on how the actors that are part of the relationship act. Blood 
donation is a relationship between the one donating the blood and the organisa-
tion that collects the blood. Even if the receiver of blood is the one who receives 
the end product, they are in no direct contact with the donor. Blood circulates 
through complicated system that pre-processes it, after which it is a medical prod-
uct like any other. However, as the effect of the variable dubbed network effect 
showed, that those who have donated are significantly more likely to personally 
know someone who has received blood. Even as the gift of blood is not personal, 
it might be that ones who know someone who has received are in a way giving to 
that someone, at least giving the gift to the system that provided the blood for 
their family member or a friend. Blood donation can be in a modern society seem 
to be quite distanced from our everyday experiences. However, if you know some-
one who has received blood or uses blood derived medicine, the recipient is no 
more an imagined stranger, but an actual human being. The need for blood is 
only revealed to the ordinary citizen by marketing campaigns made by blood 
collecting organisations or when someone close to them receives it. The recipient 
of the blood this donor donates is of course not for the relative/friend, instead the 
recipient is, in a way, represented by that person. 
The fact that those who are donors are more likely to feel that compensations for 
donating blood are acceptable demonstrates that those who participate in the gift 
relation of blood donation do accept the reciprocal nature of the relation. The 
blood collecting organisations underline the nature that it is a gift, and that the 
(small but present) compensations are part of it. The ones not participating in 
the gift relation, namely the non-donors, have not been socialized into the gift 
exchange of blood donation, and as such, do not understand the reciprocal nature 
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of it. If one would say that s/he gives blood to get the sandwich and the cup of 
coffee donors are usually given afterwards (or, more extreme example, that they 
use donation to get possible STIs tested), it would seem odd and selfish. But when 
one donates and gets the same compensation, it does seem fitting for the sacrifice 
made.  
Blood donation does seem like quite a unique kind of gift relationship. No link 
between blood donation and other type of gift giving behaviour was not found, 
which indicates that it is unique. However, it is hard to know whether the unique-
ness is related to the nature of the gift relation itself or in how the blood collection 
organisations have organised the collection of the blood. 
The quantitative examination revealed that those who are donors are more wary 
of those not part of the gift relationship. Just as Mauss realized studying archaic 
tribes, the gift relationship in blood donation limits other people out. When asked 
how they feel if people from other nations or ones who are paid the gift relation-
ship is threatened: if the new donor is from another country or paid, the gift made 
by the would be donor is not the same or appreciated in the same way. In sum-
mary, blood donation is a type of gift relationship that does have its unique char-
acter. However, since in many ways blood is collected rather than donated, the 
examination of only the gift and the donor is not enough. 
The second research question was: are the blood collection regimes applicable to 
the expanded EU, and what are the role of regimes to the gift relationship in 
blood donation? It does seem that the expanded regimes did hold explanatory 
power into blood donation. It is hard to tell if all the countries are in the right 
regime, or even if the number of regimes are correct now that so many more 
countries have joined the EU. The fact that HDI, other gift giving behaviour, and 
religiosity did not have an effect on blood donation rate does support the claim 
that regimes still hold explanatory power into blood donation. However, a more 
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thorough investigation into the regimes and how blood collection is organised in 
each country should be made. 
In the third research question I asked, what are the characteristics of blood donor 
population in the EU? I found that most sociodemographic claims made in re-
search literature regarding blood donors was correct. However, a more detailed 
view was uncovered. Two novel findings were uncovered, namely the fact that in 
those countries where army conscription was recent blood donation rate was 
higher and that those who have children are more likely to have donated blood. 
In addition, it is clear that the regimes have a major effect on what kinds of people 
donate blood, which must be taken into account when EU wide interpretations of 
the donor population. 
Blood donation is a gift relationship, albeit an odd one. Because the gift is given 
to someone the giver does not know, the relationship is between the collector of 
the blood and the donor. Therefore, the institutions which have formed around 
blood donation play such an important role. Giving a gift of blood is not some-
thing that some especially altruistic people do. Altruism does play major role, but 
how the altruism is channelled through the institutions that in each country make 
it distinct activity than donating in another county do have a big effect. The 
altruism is being channelled in different ways in different countries and regimes. 
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 Appendix 
 
Factor analysis and variables used 
 
Question: For donating blood or plasma during someone’s lifetime, do you consider 
it acceptable…? 
QE5A_1 ...to receive refreshments (e.g. coffee, soft drinks, snacks, etc.) 
QE5A_2 ...to benefit from a free physical check-up (e.g. blood pressure, pulse, body tempera-
ture) 
QE5A_3 ...to receive free testing 
QE5A_4 ...to receive free medical treatments 
QE5A_5 ...to receive non-cash items (e.g. first aid kits, etc.) 
QE5A_6 ...to receive reimbursement of travel costs 
QE5A_7 ...to receive cash amounts additional to the reimbursement of the costs related to the 
donation 
QE5A_8 ...to receive time off work (for the time needed for the donation and/or for recovery) 
All the above were retained after preliminary correlation matrix examination. 
 
 
Question: Which of the following concerns would you have if you were treated with 
donated blood, cells or tissues? 
QE8_1 - It is against your religion 
QE8_2 - Complications as a result of the medical procedure (e.g. rejecting a tissue, etc.) 
QE8_3 - The risk of contracting a disease (e.g. HIV, hepatitis, etc.) 
QE8_4 - Lack of effectiveness of the treatment 
QE8_5 - Medical errors (e.g. being administered the wrong blood type) 
QE8_6 - Receiving a donation from a paid donor 
QE8_7 - Receiving a donation from another EU Member State 
QE8_8 - Receiving a donation from a country outside the EU 
Of these QE8_7, QE8_8, and QE8_6 were retained after preliminary correlation matrix exami-
nation. 
 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variance s 
 Variable   Factor1  Factor2  Uniqueness 
concern_EU  0,7436 0,4587 
concern_paid_donor  0,5966 0,6487 
concern_ouside_EU  0,7935 0,3759 
travel_cost  0,6937 0,5162 
time_off_work  0,5823 0,6541 
refreshment  0,4343 0,6742 
non_cash_item  0,8223 0,3060 
free_physical_check  0,6207 0,5201 
free_testing  0,6545 0,5515 
free_treatment  0,6746 0,5646 
cash  0,6387 0,6156 
 
    (blanks represent loading<0.3) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                       
    Method: principal factors                         Retained factors = 2 
    Rotation: oblique promax  
 
 Factor    Variance Proportion  
Factor1   3,66085 0,6242 
Factor2   2,12802 0,3628 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
